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I. INTRODUCTION
In the movie Training Day, veteran police detective Alonzo Harris,
played by Denzel Washington, tells rookie police officer Jake Hoyt, played
by Ethan Hawke, "This shit's chess not checkers."' Although Detective Har-
ris was not talking about the biopharmaceutical industry, he might as well
have been. Over the last couple of decades, the U.S. pharmaceutical market-
place has become a sophisticated gaming industry spawned by the Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, commonly
known as Hatch-Waxman. 2 Financial success is predicated on anticipation,
responsiveness, business shrewdness, legal adeptness, and industry acumen.
Although complicity and collusion may be unlawful, the pharmaceutical
industry has pushed the outer boundaries of behavior for profit and penetra-
tion. Consider the incentive-the average cost to develop a new biotechnol-
ogy product is $1.2 billion and only one-third of drugs approved recoup re-
search and development costs. 3 The risk is high. However, the upside is
substantial. Blockbuster drugs generate billions in sales annually with cer-
tain drugs earning in excess of ten billion dollars annually.4
1. TRAINING DAY (Warner Bros. 2001).
2. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)).
3. Average Cost to Develop a New Biotechnology Product Is $1.2 Billion, MED. NEWS
TODAY, Nov. 11, 2006, http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/printerfriendlynews.php?newsid
=56377.
4. Stephanie Saul, For Jarvik Heart Pioneer, Drug Ads Raise Profile and Questions,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2008, at Al (Lipitor, marketed by Pfizer, reportedly achieved sales of
$12.7 billion in 2007).
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Biologics represent the evolving future of prescription drug therapy.5
They have already revolutionized the treatment of cancer, diabetes, hemophi-
lia, and rheumatoid arthritis, among other diseases. As the human genome is
mapped to completion, research and development is now identifying impor-
tant genetic predispositions and novel targets for therapy that will further
restructure medicine. We are truly at the threshold of a paradigm shift in
drug therapy. Herceptin, a monoclonal antibody drug used to treat a deadly
form of breast cancer, has been shown to reduce the risk of death by 33%.6
Nevertheless, the costs of biologics are immense A single biologic can cost
upwards of $200,000 annually. 8 In 2007 Americans spent over forty billion
dollars for biological drugs and they now account for approximately 20% of
global drug sales.9 It is estimated that 50% of the pharmaceutical market is
represented by biologics."l
To confound the situation, there is a newly legislated, but not yet im-
plemented approval pathway for generic biologics in the United States autho-
rized under the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009
(BPCIA). I' Prior to this act, for a generic biologic to become available, the
sponsor had to conduct lengthy and costly research; essentially the same re-
quirements as an innovator drug. 12 Thus, the research and development costs
remained significant and the cost to the patient would be only marginally
decreased. Additionally, as approval would only be considered a follow-up
without significant cost-savings, many would be reluctant to "switch," and
sponsors were disinclined to develop these products. 13 Accordingly, brand
biologics had a functional patent life in perpetuity and the incentive to com-
pete was trivial. For example, recombinant human insulin by Lilly was ap-
5. Alfred B. Engelberg et al., Balancing Innovation, Access, and Profits-Market Exclu-
sivityfor Biologics, 361 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1917, 1917 (2009).
6. Edward H. Romond et al., Trastuzumab Plus Adjuvant Chemotherapy for Operable
HER2-Positive Breast Cancer, 353 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1673, 1673 (2005).
7. Engelberg et al., supra note 5, at 1917.
8. id.
9. Doug Trapp, Biologics Don't Need Long Market Exclusivity, FTC Says,
AMEDNEWS.COM, June 29, 2009, http:llwww.ama-assn.org/amednews/2009/06/29/gvscO629.
htm; NiLs BEHNKE ET AL., BAIN & Co., BIOSIMILARS: A MARATHON, NOT A SPRINT 1 (2009),
available at http://www.bain.com/bainweb/PDFs/cms/Public/2009 BBBiosimilars.pdf.
10. Linda Hull Felcone, The Long and Winding Road to Biologic Follow-Ons,
BIOTECHNOLOGY HEALTHCARE, May 2004, at 20.
11. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 7001-03, 124
Stat. 119 (2010).
12. Engleberg et al., supra note 5, at 1918.
13. See id.
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proved in 1982, and there remains no generic for this billion dollar drug.
14
However, on March 23, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, a health reform bill, which, in part pro-
vided statutory authority for biosimilar products, like Hatch-Waxman estab-
lished for traditional drugs.'5
Although Hatch-Waxman is often viewed as a wide success, it has a
number of important flaws that should serve instructional in the evaluation of
the new regulatory framework for generic biologics. 6 Additionally, Europe
has a pathway in place to provide further insight and experience, and a Ca-
nadian system is approaching final implementation. 17 There are important
lessons to be learned and a properly structured approval pathway for generic
biologics will prove to be advantageous.
Part II of this paper presents antitrust concerns in the current biophar-
maceutical marketplace. It looks at the current system of patents and exclu-
sivity and evaluates the economic framework that makes biopharmaceuticals
so unique and susceptible to peculiar business practices. Part III of this pa-
per presents the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) regulatory role in
prescription drug regulation and then underscores the current business prac-
tices of the biopharmaceutical industry. It establishes that the future of med-
icine is biologically based and the need for a properly structured pathway for
generic biologics. Part IV of this paper reviews the regulatory framework
involving prescription drugs, including biologics. Part V deconstructs the
Hatch-Waxman provisions to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1983
(FDCA) and surmises limitations to the amendment, serving as foundation
for the evaluation of the BPCIA. Part VI of the paper reviews the current
state of generic biologics and evaluates the new legislation in the U.S. using
the E.U. legislation as a benchmark. Part VII assesses the future of follow-
14. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC
EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (30th ed. 2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/UCM071436.pdf [hereinafter DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS] (listing all drugs approved since 1984 exclusive
biologics licensed under the PHSA, and commonly referred to as the Orange Book based on
the color); see also Press Release, Eli Lilly & Co., Lilly Reports Fourth-Quarter and Full-Year
2009 Results (Jan. 28, 2010), available at http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/LLY/
885688091x0x347040/8c632725-1694-4968-bb85-8fci4a8ca95/LLY-News_2010_1 28
Financial.pdf.
15. Id.
16. See Matthew Avery, Note, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by Pharma-
ceutical Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 171, 188,
198, 200(2008).
17. See Behnke et al., supra note 9, at 2.
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up biologics in the U.S. in light of the evolving framework and provides con-
cluding remarks on the topic.
II. REGULATORY AND ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
In order to appreciate the gamesmanship involving biologics and drugs
one must need to understand the regulatory interplay between antitrust law
and patents and the economic framework surrounding prescription drugs.
A. Antitrust Considerations
Antitrust involves the balance between government granted monopoly
in the form of patents and other intellectual property rights, and the abuse of
monopoly power to hinder competition. 18 It serves to protect the integrity of
the competitive process and enable consumers wide access to the best possi-
ble products at the lowest possible prices. It serves to try and level the play-
ing field for all players in a market.
Antitrust legislation originated in the late 1800s while certain business-
es, called trusts, controlled entire industries, most notably steel and oil. 9 As
expected, prices soared while quality and services diminished.20 In response
to growing concern, President Theodore Roosevelt and Congress led the bust
of these trusts, through pioneering antitrust legislation. 21 Antitrust legislation
has shown to lower prices, improve service and spawn vigorous competi-
22tion. Amazingly, it is some of the most direct and succinct law on the
books. It is elegant in its simplicity. Consider Section 1 of the Sherman Act
is ninety-six words and outlaws "[e]very contract, combination ... or con-
spiracy in restraint of trade., 23 Section 2 is eighty-two words and finds
"[elvery person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize ... guilty
of a felony. ' 24 The impact of these 178 words has evolved an encyclopedia
18. See FTC Fact Sheet: Antitrust Laws: A Brief History, 1, http://www.ftc.govfbcp/edu
/microsites/youarehere/pages/pdf/FTC-Competition_Antitrust-Laws.pdf [hereinafter FlrC Fact
Sheet].
19. Id. John D. Rockefeller, founder of Standard Oil Company, reportedly amassed a net
worth of over a billion dollars making him the world's first billionaire. John D. Rockefeller,
http://www.johndrockefeller.org (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
20. FTC Fact Sheet, supra note 18, at 1; see also Rudolph J.R. Peritz, The Sherman Anti-
Trust Act of 1890, in HISTORIANS ON AMERICA, DECISIONS THAT MAKE A DIFFERENCE 31, 33
(2007), available at http://www.america.gov/media/pdf/books/historians-on-america.pdf#pop
up.
21. Peritz, supra note 20, at 35.
22. Id. at 35-36.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 2.
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of case law, has allowed U.S. businesses to develop new industries, and has
provided U.S. consumers remarkable services and products at reasonable
prices. Today, antitrust legislation remains a vital aspect to competition and
affects such diverse industries as cable television, telephone service, internet
search engines, and computer operating systems.
Antitrust legislation encompasses federal antitrust laws, enforced by the
Department of Justice and state antitrust laws, enforced by state attorneys
general. Antitrust cases involving drugs are primarily within the purview
of the FTC Bureau of Competition, Health Care Services, and Products Divi-
sion, which generally regulates the pharmaceutical industry. 26 Antitrust leg-
islation provides for suits by the injured party27 including State Attorneys
General, 28 and the award of injunctive relief.29 Antitrust law involving drugs
is based primarily in Section 1 of the Sherman Act-trusts; ° Section 2 of the
Sherman Act-monopolies;3' Section 2 of the Clayton Act, commonly re-
ferred to as the Robinson-Patman Act-prohibiting price discrimination;
3 2
Section 3 of the Clayton Act--dealing with exclusionary practices, such as
tying arrangements and predatory pricing;33 Section 7 of the Clayton Act-
affecting mergers and acquisitions; 34 Hart-Scott-Rodino--involving pre-
merger notification; 35 and Section 5 of the FTC Act-preventing unfair and
deceptive business practices.36
B. Patents and Exclusivity
Patent law involves "the right to exclude others from making, using, of-
fering for sale, or selling [an] invention throughout the United States or im-
porting [an] invention into the United States., 37 Patents are granted to prod-
ucts based on utility, novelty, 38 and non-obviousness. 39 Patent law is consti-
25. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, OVERVIEW OF FTC ANTITRUST ACTIONS IN
PHARMACEUTICAL SERVICES AND PRODUCTS 1, 6, 8 (2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/
0608rxupdate.pdf [hereinafter FTC 2008 REPORT].
26. Id. at 1.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 15(c).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 26.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 2.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (commonly referred to as the Anti-Chain Store Act).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 14.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 18.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 18(a).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 45.
37. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006).
38. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
[Vol. 34
6
Nova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 12
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol34/iss3/12
2010] ANTITRUST AND THE BIOPHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 635
tutionally based and within the federal purview.4° Article 1, Section 8 of the
U.S. Constitution reads "Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au-
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Dis-
coveries.' Patent law serves to foster innovation by protecting the interest
of the innovator and to prevent copycats that simply pilfer the reward.42 The
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is the federal agency
responsible for granting patents and is an Agency in the U.S. Department of
Commerce.43
There are three types of patents available for prosecution. 44 Drug pa-
tents primarily incorporate utility patents and typically involve the drug
product, formulation, manufacturing process, and method of use.45 Theoreti-
cally, all patented drugs are subject to replication, including complex biolog-
icals." A properly filed patent, must
contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and
use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his invention.
47
When talking about drugs and biologics another important aspect to
consider is exclusivity. 48 Exclusivity refers to "exclusive marketing rights
granted by the FDA upon approval of a drug. 49 Patents are granted by the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office based on statutory requirements, whereby
39. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
40. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8; 35 U.S.C. § 1.
41. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
42. See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Who We Are, http://www.uspto.gov/about/
index.jsp (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
43. 35 U.S.C. § 1.
44. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Process, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/
process/index.jsp#heading-2 (last visited Apr. 17, 2010). Design patents are issued for orna-
mental designs; plant patents are issued for distinct and new varieties of plants; utility patents
are issued for any "process, machine, article of manufacture, [or] composition of matter," or
any new and useful improvement thereof. Id.
45. Terry G. Mahn, Patenting Drug Products: Anticipating Hatch-Waxman Issues Dur-
ing the Claims Drafting Process, 54 FooD & DRUG L.J. 245, 246 (1999).
46. See Pathway for Biosimilars Act, H.R. 5629, § 101(a)(2) 110th Cong. (2008).
47. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
48. See FDA, Frequently Asked Questions on Patents and Exclusivity, http://www.fda.
gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ucm079031 .htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
49. Id.
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exclusivity is granted by the FDA upon a drug's proof of safety and effica-
cy. 50 Patents are granted for twenty years.51 Exclusivity depends on the type
of patent issued and is typically five years.52 Although an innovator drug
may have no patent protection remaining, once it is approved by the FDA it
gains a period of exclusivity, whereby the FDA cannot approve a generic
competitor.53
The interplay between patent law and antitrust law strikes an important
and delicate balance between competing interests.54 Patents are government
granted monopolies, while antitrust is government's bust of monopolies.
The two are in complete philosophical opposition.56 Interestingly, however,
both seek to accomplish the same end: increase innovation.57 Patents seek
this by directly rewarding innovation and making public information on ex-
isting products to help promote further research and development, thus pay-
ing it forward. 8 Antitrust seeks to promote innovation through a leveling of
the competitive process, thus allowing new innovators to research and re-
ward.59
Trade secrets are another intellectual property right, like patents, but
with critical differences. 60 Trade secrets refer to "any information that can be
used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently
valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over
others.'
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or com-
pilation of information which is used in one's business, and which
gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors
who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical
compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving ma-
50. See 35 U.S.C. § 1; 21 C.F.R. § 314.108 (2009).
51. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
52. 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(b)(2).
53. See id.
54. See Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust and Patent Law as Component Parts of Innova-
tion Policy, 34 J. CORP. L. 1259, 1260 (2009).
55. Id. at 1259.
56. See id.
57. Id. at 1260.
58. See id. at 1261.
59. See Leslie, supra note 54, at 1263-64.
60. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. c (1995).
61. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPEITION § 39.
[Vol. 34
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terials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of custom-
ers.
6 2
Generally speaking, to be protected, a trade secret must be kept secretive, be
of value, and provide a competitive business advantage. 63 Trade secrets dif-
fer from patents in three important regards.6' First, a trade secret can survive
indefinitely, unlike a patent which expires after twenty years.65 Secondly, a
trade secret does not involve disclosure of any information and in fact re-
quires the holder to conceal the practice.66 Thirdly, trade secrets offer no real
protection against reverse engineering and copy.67 The classic example of a
trade secret is the recipe for Coca-Cola. If Coca-Cola sought patent protec-
tion, they would have to disclose the recipe and then receive protection for
only the statutory time.68 Not a great business practice for the Atlanta based
company using a recipe from Pharmacist John Pemberton, developed over
one hundred years ago. 69 However, if at any point a competitor can legally
determine the recipe, Coca-Cola is at a complete loss for compensation or
harm.
70
The pharmaceutical marketplace does not typically rely on trade secrets
to protect innovation.71 Although the protection afforded is expansive, the
risk is too great.72 Pharmaceutical companies notoriously employ a number
of competitive intelligence systems, and the technology used to reverse engi-
neer drugs is rather simple for those in the business.73 Instead, the major
pharmaceutical companies rely on patent protection and urbane marketing
62. RESTATEMENT (FIRST)OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
63. FLA. STAT. § 812.081(1)(c) (2009).
64. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. c.
65. See id.; 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
66. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. c, f.
67. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. c.
68. See 35 U.S.C. § 112; 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
69. John Stith Pemberton: Who Invented Coca-Cola?, The Chronicles of Coca-Cola,
http://www.thecoca-colacompany.con/heritage/chronicle-birth-refreshing-idea.html (last
visited Apr. 17, 2010).
70. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. b; 18 U.S.C. § 1832
(2006) (misappropriation of a trade secret for economic harm is unlawful).
71. See PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., DELIVERING ON THE PROMISE OF
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: THE NEED TO MAINTAIN STRONG AND PREDICTABLE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 7 (2002) [hereinafter PHRMA, DELIVERING ON THE
PROMISE].
72. See id.
73. See Phoebe M. Roberts & William S. Hayes, Information Needs and the Role of Text
Mining in Drug Development, 13 PAC. SYMP. ON BIOCOMPUTING 592, 596 (2008), available at
http://psb.stanford.edu/psb-online/proceedings/psb08/roberts.pdf.
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campaigns to maximize profits, as accountability to shareholders is an impor-
tant obligation.74
C. Economic Framework
The pharmaceutical industry has a very unique economic framework
based on the styles of competition, manufacturing issues, research and de-
velopment costs, barriers to entry, and elasticity of demand.
Life saving therapies, and drugs in general, are said to have inelastic
demand.75 Practically speaking this means as the price increases, the demand
stays the same regardless of supply. In classic economic theory, a product's
price is viewed as the equilibrium point between supply and demand in a
perfectly competitive marketplace.76 However, in a situation like Type I
diabetes where you need insulin to survive, the relationship between supply
and demand is irrelevant to establish a price point. A diabetic will pay what-
ever price possible, independent of the supply.
Another important economic consideration involving drugs is pricing.
77
There is no price regulation in the United States, although every other Wes-
ternized country has some regulation. 78 For example, there are direct price
regulations in Canada, France and Italy.79 Indirect regulations exist in Japan
-insurance reimbursements-and the United Kingdom-profits.8 ° Pricing
is extremely complex in the United States as insurance, managed care, and
government payers confound the situation, and the inelasticity of demand
supports high pricing. 81 Drugs are further unique in that they involve impor-
tant economies of scale.82 An established pharmaceutical manufacturing
74. See id. at 592-93.
75. See Economics A-Z: Elasticity, The Economist, http://www.economist.com/
research/economics/alphabetic.cfm?letter=E (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
76. See Supply and Demand, Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/
supply and demand (last visited Apr. 17, 2010). Alfred Marshall was a British economist who
is credited with identifying supply and demand in his text, Principles of Economics, published
in 1890. See generally ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (Prometheus Books
1997) (8th ed. 1920).
77. See Neeraj Sood et al., The Effect of Regulation on Pharmaceutical Revenues: Expe-
rience in Nineteen Countries, 28 HEALTH AFF. (Web Exclusive) w125, w125 (2008).
78. Seeid.atw136.
79. Seeid.atw127.
80. Seeid.atw130-31.
81. See, e.g., Allison K. Young & Meredyth Smith Andrus, Pharmaceutical Pricing and
Hatch-Waxman Reform: The Right Prescription, 1 J. GENERIC MEDS. 228, 229 (2004).
82. See Patricia M. Danzon, Economics of the Pharmaceutical Industry, NAT'L BUREAU
OF ECON. RESEARCH, Research Summary 2006, www.nber.org/reporter/fall06/danzon.htm
(last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
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facility can manufacturer drugs at a nominal cost. This does not hold as true
for biologics, which may have a considerable cost associated with manufac-
ture, but economies of scale still ring true as with all large scale productions
and industries.83 Once the facility is established, the cost to produce is rather
low.
The pharmaceutical industry is inimitable in that it encompasses three
types of competition, each with unique economic considerations.' First,
there is brand/brand competition.85 This typically involves drugs in the same
class and drugs used for similar indications.86 An example of this is Viagra
and Cialis. The second type of competition is brand/generic. 87 This occurs
when a drug loses its exclusivity and patent protection and a generic drug
becomes available.88 An example of this is Prozac and fluoxetine, manufac-
tured by a generic company. The third type of competition among drugs is
generic/generic..89 As drugs lose their patents, generics become available.90
An example of this might include fluoxteine-by Mylan Pharmaceuticals-
and fluoxetine-by Teva Pharmaceuticals.
Barriers to entry are another essential concept in understanding the in-
terplay between patent and antitrust with drugs. Drug development is consi-
dered to have a slow speed of entry and new players are at a considerable
disadvantage. 91 It takes approximately eight years to develop a drug from
initial research to market approval.9" And this is for skilled players. A new
company seeking to research and develop a drug would face a number of
challenges, including necessary supplier agreements, specialized industry
regulation and intellectual property right considerations, sunken costs, and
susceptibility to predatory pricing.
83. See id.
84. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, How INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS
HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY xi (1998), available
at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/6xx/doc655/pharm.pdf [hereinafter CONG. BUDGET OFFICE,
How INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS].
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id. at xii-xiii.
88. See id.
89. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, How INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS,
supra note 84, at xiii.
90. See id.
91. See Red Orbit News, New Drugs Are Taking Longer to Bring to Market in the U.S.,
According to Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, http://www.redorbit.com/
news/health/291272/new drugs-are taking-ionger__tobring-to-marketjin/ (last visited Apr.
17, 2010).
92. See Average Cost to Develop a New Biotechnology Product Is $1.2 Billion, supra
note 3.
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As a result of these factors, the pharmaceutical marketplace has evolved
into a true oligopoly. As such, there is a great incentive for price fixing, con-
scious parallelism, tacit collusion and collusive pricing tendencies, along
with heavy reliance on game theory.93 Not surprisingly, the industry has
faced accusations of monopolization, agreements not to compete, agreements
on price or price-related terms, predatory pricing, unlawful horizontal mer-
gers between competitors, vertical mergers involving PBMs, potential com-
petition mergers, illegal tying, and other arrangements.
94
HI. INDUSTRY OVERVIEW AND REGULATION
The pharmaceutical industry is a competitive and potentially very lucra-
tive marketplace. Profits are measured in billions of dollars in annual sales
and unexpected, sudden market collapses are not uncommon. One day
Vioxx was a jackpot with sales of $2.5 billion annually; the next it was a
liability estimated at $50 billion to Merck.95 Black-box warnings, other labe-
ling revisions, and competing drug approvals incessantly threaten a drugs
survival and profitability.96 One in five drugs will see a black-box warning
or require market withdrawal in a twenty-five year life-span. 97 Loss of pa-
tents protection is another critical issue. Within two months of losing patent
protection, Prozac lost 70% of its multibillion dollar market share.
98
A. FDA Oversight
The FDA is one of eleven agencies of the Health and Human Services
(HHS) which is the department responsible for "protecting the health of all
Americans."" The statutory functions of the FDA are formally delegated to
93. See Julia Rosenthal, Hatch-Waxman Use or Abuse? Collusive Settlements Between
Brand-Name and Generic Drug Manufacturers, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 317, 319-20 (2002).
94. See FTC 2008 REPORT, supra note 25.
95. See Aaron Smith, Jury: Merck Negligent, CNNMONEY.COM, Aug. 22, 2005,
http://money.cnn.com2005/08/19/news/fortune5O0/vioxx/index.htm; Matthew Herper, Merck
Vioxx Liability Could Near $50 Billion, FORBES.COM, Aug. 22, 2005, http://www.forbes.com/
2005/08/22/merck-vioxx-liability-0822markets0 .html.
96. See Karen E. Lasser et al., Timing of New Black Box Warnings and Withdrawals for
Prescription Medications, 287 JAMA 2215 (2002).
97. Id. at 2216.
98. Richard G. Frank, Regulation of Follow-on Biologics, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 841,
842 (2007).
99. Department of Health & Human Services, About HHS, http://www.hhs.gov/about/
(last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
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the Secretary of the HHS,' ° who is appointed by the President and is a mem-
ber of the President's cabinet. °1 The FDA ensures safe and effective drugs
to U.S. consumers, in addition to a myriad of other roles.'0 2 The FDA also
oversees food, veterinary medicines, dietary supplements, medical devices,
radiation emitting devices, and cosmetics. 0 3 The FDA has six product cen-
ters, one research center, and two offices within the agency that regulate its
various responsibilities.' 4  The Center for Drug Evaluation and Research
(CDER) is the largest center in the FDA and is charged with prescription and
non-prescription drugs.'0 5 The Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research
(CBER) is responsible for biologics including some drugs. 06
Like all administrative agencies, the FDA has three essential functions:
rulemaking authority, investigative/enforcement authority, and adjudicatory
100. FDA, FDA Staff Manual Guides, Volume II, Delegations of Authority: Regulatory
Delegations of Authority to the Commissioner Food and Drugs, http://www.fda.gov/
AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/StaffManualGuides/ucm080711.htm (last visited Apr. 17,
2010).
101. See McDERMOTt, NEWS, (McDermott Will & Emery), President Obama Announces
FDA Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner Appointments (Mar. 16, 2009),
http://www.mwe.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publications.nidetail/object - id/d878770f-69b9-
455f-a879-250d5caf9c6d.cfm. The Current FDA Commissioner is Dr. Margaret Hamburg.
FDA, Commissioner's Page, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CommissionersPage/default.htm
(last visited Apr. 17, 2010). The Current HHS Secretary is Kathleen Sebelius. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., Kathleen Sebelius Confirmed as Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services, http://www.hhs.gov/secretary/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
102. FDA, What the Food and Drug Administration Regulates, http://fda.org/index.php?
article=what-the-food-and-drug-administration-regulates (last visited Apr. 17, 2010). Admin-
istrative agencies are a product of the legislation to oversee complex matters of Government.
The FDA implements the rules and regulations while Congress paints with broad brush
strokes on food and drug issues.
103. Id.
104. FDA, Organization Chart, http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/Centers
Offices/OrganizationCharts/UCM198460.pdf. The newest center in the FDA is the Center for
Tobacco Products established upon passage of Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco
Control Act on June 22, 2009. News Release, FDA, FDA Launches New Center for Tobacco
Products, (Aug. 19, 2009), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/
ucm179410.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2010); Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Con-
trol Act, Pub. L. No. § 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776, 1776 (2009). This act gave the FDA new
authorities over tobacco including a ban on certain flavored cigarettes, requiring companies to
fully disclose ingredients and additives, prohibiting the terms "light" and "mild," and stopping
youth-focused marketing. See id. at 1784, 1799, 1831.
105. FDA, How Drugs Are Developed and Approved, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/default.htm (last visited
Apr. 17, 2010).
106. FDA, About the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, http://www.fda.gov/
AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CBER/default.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
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power. 10 7 Nevertheless, administrative agencies are often referred to as a
headless, fourth branch of government as their rulemaking authority is
granted by the legislature, their investigative and enforcement authority is
accountable to the Executive branch, and their adjudicatory authority is sub-
ordinate to the court system. These inherent limitations have often inhibited
the FDA and account for many of the claims made by its detractors.
The FDA regulates approximately $1 trillion worth of goods, 08 with an
annual budget of $3.2 billion.' °9 Approximately $828 million of this budget
originates from user fees."' These user fees were first established in 1992 in
response to growing concern about the efficiency of the FDA's review
process when Congress enacted the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA
I)."' PDUFA reauthorizes every five years. 12 PDUFA affords the FDA the
opportunity to hire reviewers and expedites the drug approval process." 3
The most recent enactment, PDUFA IV, was included in Title I of the Food
and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA). 14 Under
PDUFA, the FDA collects three types of user fees from the industry: appli-
cation fees, establishment fees, and product fees." 5 PDUFA has been heavi-
ly criticized as the regulators-the FDA-have now become very tight bed-
fellows with the industry, and the agency now relies on this funding for sur-
107. See JOHN P. SWANN, FDA's ORIGIN, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/
History/Origin/ucm124403.htm (adapted from A HISTORICAL GUIDE TO THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT (George Kurian, ed. 1998)).
108. FDA, FAQs by Topic, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDAIWhatWeDo/FAQs/default.htm
(last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
109. FDA, Summary of the FDA's FY 2010 Budget, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/
ReportsManualsFormsfReports/BudgetReports/ucml 53154.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
The budget for 2010 specifically includes a section on generic biologics-referred to as "Fol-
low-on Biologics." Id.
110. Id.
111. See 21 U.S.C. § 379g-h (2006).
112. See FDA, White Paper Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA): Adding Resources
and Improving Performance in FDA Review of New Drug Applications, http://www.fda.gov/
Forlndustry/UserFees/PrescriptionDrugUserFee/ucm 119253.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2010)
[hereinafter FDA, White Paper].
113. Id.
114. See FDA, PDUFA Legislation and Background: PDUFA IV, http://www.fda.gov/
Forlndustry/UserFees/PrescriptionDrugUserFee/ucm 14441 l.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
115. FDA, White Paper, supra note 112; see also FDA, Small Business Assistance: Fre-
quently Asked Questions on Prescription Drug User Fees (PDUFA), http://www.fda.gov/
Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/SmallBusinessAssistance/ucm069943.htm (last visited
Apr. 17, 2010); Prescription Drug User Fee Rates for Fiscal Year 2010, 74 Fed. Reg. 38,451,
38,451 (Aug. 3, 2009).
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vival, a very alarming proposition." 16 User fees account for approximately
fifty percent of drug review costs.
117
In determining which products are assessed user fees, the FDA widely
utilizes a reference entitled Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations."8 This reference includes all drug
products approved by the FDA since 1984 including therapeutic equivalents,
so called generic drugs."1 9 Drugs listed in the Orange Book are assumed to
be marketed and thus qualify for user fees. 120 The Orange Book also serves
as the official compilation of patent and exclusivity listings of drugs recog-
nized by the FDA.'
2 1
B. Research and Development
The drug approval process is a costly, complex, and cumbersome one.
In the screening and development phase, a myriad of laboratory compounds
are thoroughly screened for activity. 122 So called "hits" are then further
tested for "leads" in a process coined hits-to-leads.12 3 Medicinal chemists
work to identify and then (re)engineer the most active and stable compounds
to focus further development, all in the hopes of finding the next blockbus-
ter.124 Compounds, most active in vitro, are administered to rodents and then
primates to assess plausibility in humans. 25 Products appearing promising
can then be administered to humans in a complex and closely monitored sys-
tem of escalating doses and monitoring. 26 Products are further tested for
carcinogenicity, mutagenecity, and teratogenecity.1
27
116. See FDA, White Paper, supra note 112.
117. Id.
118. Natalie M. Derzko, The Impact of Recent Reforms of the Hatch- Waxman Scheme on
Orange Book Strategic Behavior and Pharmaceutical Innovation, 45 IDEA 165, 169 (2005).
119. See id. at 167, 169.
120. See DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS, supra note 14,
at ix.
121. Id. ati.
122. FDA, Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/Approva]Applications/
InvestigationalNewDruglNDApplication/default.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2010) [hereinafter
FDA, IND].
123. Konrad H. Bleicher et al., Hit and Lead Generation: Beyond High-Throughput
Screening, 2 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 369, 371 (2003).
124. Id. at 377.
125. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(2) (2009).
126. See 21 C.F.R.§ 312.21.
127. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.32(c)(B).
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Before administering a so called investigational drug to humans, the
sponsor must seek an Investigational New Drug Application (IND). 28 Tech-
nically, this serves as legal permission to move an unapproved, investiga-
tional drug into the stream of interstate commerce. 129 The application has
three focus areas: 1) animal pharmacology and toxicology; 2) chemistry and
manufacturing; and 3) clinical protocols and investigator information.' 30 The
FDA reviews this application with an eye on safety and future development,
all the while understanding that drug development is inherently dangerous,
but necessary. 13' The FDA has a thirty day window to issue a "clinical hold"
on an IND, or else the application is deemed approved and the drug can then
be administered to human subjects in the first of a series of research proto-
cols. 13
2
Phase I studies are the first studies involving humans. 3 3 The drug is
typically administered to a small number of healthy male volunteers, usually
between ages twenty and eighty. 34 The drug is evaluated for the preferred
route of administration, a tolerable dosage range, safety and side effects, and
reviewed for its pharmacokinetic characteristics. 135 Next, Phase 1I studies are
conducted whereby the drug is administered to a population of interest,
usually about 200 patients inflicted with the disease, but otherwise healthy.
36
These studies establish preliminary efficacy data, identify the preferred dos-
ing regimen and target dose, and further assess safety. 137 Phase III studies
are typically large scale randomized, controlled and uncontrolled trials in-
volving thousands of patients to substantiate efficacy, expand safety data,
and confirm the optimal dose.1
38
128. See 21 U.S.C. § 3550) (2006); see also 21 C.F.R. § 312. IND is also referred to as
"Notice of Claimed Investigational Exemption for a New Drug." 21 C.F.R. § 312.3(b).
129. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a); 21 C.F.R. § 312.
130. FDA, IND, supra note 122.
131. See id.
132. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, MANUAL OF
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 6030.1 2 (1998), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDER/ManualofPoliciesProcedures/UCM082022.pdf [hereinafter
CDER, 1998 POLICIES AND PROCEDURES].
133. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a)(1).
134. Id.; see also FDA, Inside Clinical Trials: Testing Medical Products in People, http://
www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm143531.htm (last visited Apr. 17,
2010).
135. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a). Pharmacokinetic characteristics refer to the body's action on
a drug. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(5). That is, absorption, distribution, metabolism, and eli-
mination/excretion. 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(8)(i).
136. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b).
137. See id.
138. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(c).
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Overall, the research and development process is a risky endeavor. The
top ten pharmaceutical companies bring an average of only 0.6 drugs to mar-
ket per year. 39 Only five out of five thousand compounds make it to human
testing, of which only one is ultimately approved for human use.' 40 Then
remarkably, only one-third of drugs approved generate sufficient earnings to
recoup average research and development costs.141
C. Marketing Strategies Employed
In response to the highly risky, yet lucrative business of pharmaceuti-
cals, the industry has developed a complex multi-faceted approach to in-
creasing sales, promoting widespread, and some would say indiscriminate
use, and discerning themselves from the competition. 42 Drug companies
hire celebrity spokespersons and cheerleaders as sale associates.143 They
utilize a sophisticated system of data mining to identify changes in market
share and physician identifiable prescribing habits.'" The industry has even
been accused of creating diseases and selling sickness. 145 They have an in-
famous reputation for providing lavish incentives to physicians for the mere
opportunity to detail them on the benefits of their product. 46 They regularly
masquerade marketing as "educational symposia and seminars."' 147 Compa-
nies seed the market through the use of "free" drug samples and low cost in-
hospital contracts. 148 They use prominent physician names, along with ghost
writers in medical publications and have even gone so far as to establish
journals. 49 Although these tactics may be facially legal, the ethical consid-
139. Big Pharma-Biotech Partnering Holds Promise for Improving R&D Productivity,
MED. NEWS TODAY, Mar. 26, 2007, http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/66151.php.
140. Tufts Ctr. for the Study of Drug Dev., Backgrounder: How New Drugs Move
Through the Development and Approval Process (2001), available at http://csdd.tufts.edu/
files/uploads/how new-drugs-move.pdf.
141. Ten Percent of New Prescription Drugs Generate Half of the Industry's Net Returns,
BUSINESS WIRE (New York), Dec. 13, 2002, at 1.
142. See RAY MOYNIHAN & ALAN CASSELS, SELLING SICKNESS: HOW THE WORLD'S
BIGGEST PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES ARE TURNING Us ALL INTO PATIENTS x-xviii (2005).
143. Id. at 41; Stephanie Saul, Gimme an Rx! Cheerleaders Pep Up Drug Sales, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 28, 2005, at Al.
144. See Michael Heesters, Comment, An Assault on the Business of Pharmaceutical Data
Mining, I 1 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 789, 789 (2009).
145. See MOYNIHAN & CASSELS, supra note 142, at xi-xii.
146. Id. at 23.
147. See id. at 26.
148. See id. at 23-24.
149. Id. at 25; Posting of Bob Grant, Merck Published Fake Journal, to http://www.the-
scientist.com/blog/display/55671 (Apr. 30, 2009); see also Joseph S. Ross et al., Guest Au-
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erations are notable. Direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) of drugs has
become a great windfall for the industry since 1997 when the FDA issued a
draft guidance that effectively enabled the use of broadcast ads for DTCA. 50
Currently, only the United States and New Zealand allow DTCA of pharma-
ceutical products.
151
In addition to FDA regulation, the industry highly self-regulates.
PhRMA, the pharmaceutical trade association, publishes a Code on Interac-
tions with Healthcare Professionals, which provides ethical guidance on in-
dustry practice. 152 The updated code took effect in January 2009 and in-
cludes a number of changes targeting some of the above mentioned practic-
es. 153 The other major regulatory guidance is published by the Office of the
Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services and is
called the Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufactur-
ers. 154 It calls for drug companies to establish voluntary compliance pro-
grams within the company.'55 Specifically, the program targets three risk
areas: "(1) Integrity of data used. . . to establish payment; (2) kickbacks and
other illegal remuneration; and (3) compliance with laws regulating drug
samples.' 56 The document is intended for drug companies to gain insight
and foster adherence to relevant laws, especially involving federal health
care programs.1
57
Another important business tactic widely impacting healthcare delivery
involves off-label drug use. 158 Off-label use refers to the delivery of a phar-
maceutical distinct from its approved labeling. 5 9 This can range from an
thorship and Ghostwriting in Publications Related to Rofecoxib, 299 JAMA 1800, 1802
(2008) (describing Merck's use of ghostwriters with Vioxx).
150. FDA, Prescription Drug Promotion, http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/testimony/
ucm1 15206.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
151. Barbara Mintzes, Should Canada Allow Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescrip-
tion Drugs?, 55 CAN. FAM. PHYSICIAN 131, 131 (2009).
152. PHRMA, CODE ON INTERACTIONS WITH HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS 2 (2008), avail-
able at http://www.phrma.org/files/attachments/PhRMA Marketing Code 2008.pdf.
153. See Press Release, PhRMA, PhRMA Revised Marketing Code Reinforces Commit-
ment to Responsible Interactions with Healthcare Professionals (July 10, 2008),
http://www.phrma.org/news-room/press-releases/phrma-code-reinforces-commitment-to-re
sponsible-interactions_withhealthcare-professionals.
154. See generally OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers,
68 Fed. Reg. 23,731, 23,731 (May 5, 2003).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 23,733.
157. Id. at23,731.
158. See Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use-Rethinking the Role of the
FDA, 358 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1427, 1427 (2008), available at http://content.nejm.org/cgi/
reprint/358/14/1427.pdf.
159. Id.
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increased dose to a shortened duration of treatment to a novel use.160 Once a
drug is approved by the FDA, the actual use becomes part of the practice of
medicine, and thus beyond the purview of the FDA. 161 Off-label drug use
accounts for approximately twenty percent, with certain drug classes ap-
proaching seventy-five percent. 62  This use is considerable and has even
landed a prominent physician in jail for unlawful promotion. 163
IV. STATUTORY REGULATION OF DRUGS AND BIOLOGICS
Drugs, including biologics, are regulated primarily under federal legis-
lation via the interstate commerce clause of the United States Constitution.
Traditionally, health, safety, and welfare, the so called police powers, are
reserved to the states. However, as drugs "substantially affect interstate
commerce," their regulation is deemed a federal matter subject to federal
purview.'"
A. Drug Regulation under the FDCA
Federal drug regulation occurs primarily through the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).165 This Act was first legislated in 1938 in
response to the tragic sulfanilamide incident and has since undergone a num-
ber of important revisions.1 66 In part, the act prohibits the movement in inter-
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. Id.
163. Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, Eastern Dist. N.Y., Psychiatrist Charged with
Conspiracy to Illegally Market the Prescription Medication Xyrem, Also Known as "GHB,"
for Unapproved Medical Uses on Behalf of its Manufacturer (Apr. 5, 2006), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nye/pr/2006/2006aprO5.html; see also Alex Berenson, Indictment
of Doctor Tests Drug Marketing Rules, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2006, at Al. Pfizer recently
settled to pay $2.3 billion for fraudulent marketing which is "the largest health care fraud
settlement" in history. News Release, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., Justice Depart-
ment Announces Largest Health Care Fraud Settlement in Its History (Sept. 2, 2009),
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2009pres/09/20090902a.html. The settlement included a
felony plea to the FDCA and a billion dollar settlement under the civil False Claims Act. Id.
164. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
165. See generally Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, § 1, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.
(2006).
166. For a nice history and overview on the regulation of drugs see Matthew J. Seamon,
Plan Bfor the FDA: A Need for a Third Class of Drug Regulation in the United States Involv-
ing a "Pharmacist-Only" Class of Drugs, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 521, 537-47
(2006).
19
Seamon: Antitrust and the Biopharmaceutical Industry: Lessons from Hatch-
Published by NSUWorks, 2010
NOVA LAW REVIEW
state commerce of a new drug without an approved application. 67 Approval
can arise from a New Drug Application (NDA), "paper NDA," abbreviated
NDA, or Over-the-County (OTC) Monograph.
68
Under the FDCA, a drug is defined as an article "intended for use in the
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease."' 169 This
means the intended use, via the labeling of a product, dictates its status. The
FDCA further regulates drugs through its misbranding and adulteration pro-
visions. 70 Adulteration refers, in part, to a drug product that is "filthy, putr-
id, or decomposed."'' Misbranding involves a drug's label. 72 Any false or
misleading labeling statements render the drug misbranded. 73 Drugs found
to be adulterated or misbranded are subject to seizure by the FDA and other
enforcement mechanisms. 7 4 The FDCA also authorizes the IND, which
allows an unapproved drug to be researched. 75 Historically, a number of
biologics have been approved solely under the FDCA, including insulin and
human growth hormone.
76
1. New Drug Application (NDA)
Under the FDCA, drugs require premarket clearance before they can be
sold in the United States. 77 Drugs that appear to have a positive risk to ben-
efit ratio are then sought for marketing approval. 78 This typically occurs
through a New Drug Application (NDA), authorized under section 505(b)(1)
of the FDCA. 179  The NDA is the comprehensive collection of data and
knowledge on a drug product. 80 The goal of an NDA is to demonstrate to
the FDA that a drug is safe and effective, the labeling is appropriate, and that
167. 21 U.S.C. §355(a) (2006).
168. See FDA, Small Business Assistance, supra note 115.
169. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(B).
170. 21 U.S.C. §§ 342, 352.
171. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(3).
172. 21 U.S.C. § 352(a).
173. Id.
174. 21 U.S.C. § 334. Although the FDA maintains enforcement authority for civil, crim-
inal, and administrative actions, they maintain a cooperative working relationship with the
U.S. Department of Justice involving many criminal matters. See 21 U.S.C. § 335. In fact,
section 335 authorizes the FDA to report criminal violations to said department. Id.
175. 21 U.S.C. § 355(i); 21 C.F.R. 312.23 (2009).
176. Andrew Wasson, Taking Biologics for Granted? Takings, Trade Secrets, and Off-
Patent Biologics, 4 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 9 (2005).
177. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.1; 21 U.S.C. § 355.
178. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.2.
179. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b); 21 C.F.R. § 314.50.
180. See id.
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the manufacturing ensures the drug's identity, strength, quality, and purity.'
8
'
The NDA even includes a section on environmental impact.'82
Drugs have to demonstrate safety and efficacy under a burden of sub-
stantial evidence. 183  They also have to submit preclinical data-animal
pharmacology and toxicology-to demonstrate current good manufacturing
practices, compliant product packaging and labeling, and follow postmarket-
ing requirements including reporting known adverse effects.'8
The NDA is assigned a Therapeutic Review Classification based on the
importance of the drug, which dictates the FDA's timeline for review. 185 The
FDA typically then utilizes an advisory committee to help evaluate the drug
and make a non-binding recommendation as to approval.' 86 Applications
with deficiencies receive a "complete response letter" describing the agen-
cy's findings of concern. 87 Drugs suitable for approval can then be ap-
proved and licensed under the FDCA to move in interstate commerce as long
as they are not adulterated or misbranded. 88 Any changes in indications,
manufacturing procedures, labeling, dosage form, or dosing, require a sup-
plemental application referred to as an NDA.
189
B. Biologics Defined
Biologic drugs are large molecule products, typically proteins, derived
from a living organism or one of its products and manufactured through a
181. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b); 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(b).
182. 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(1)(iii).
183. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d).
184. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC
DRUG COMPETITION, at 6 (2009), available at http:llwww.ftc.govlos/2009/06/P083901
biologicsreport.pdf [hereinafter FTC 2009 REPORTI; 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1).
185. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MANUAL
OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 6020.3 1, at (2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/
downI oads/AboutFDA/ReportsManuasForms/StaffPoliciesandProcedures/ucm82000.pdf.
Drugs that provide a "significant improvement compared to marketed products," receive
priority review within six months, and remaining drugs are reviewed within a ten month time
frame. Id. at 1-2; FDA, Fast Track, Accelerated Approval and Priority Review, http://www.
fda.gov/ForConsumers/ByAudience/ForPatientAdvocates/SpeedingAccesstol mportantNewTh
erapies/ucm128291 .htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
186. See FDA, Advisory Committees, http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/default.
htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2010). The FDA identifies forty-nine advisory committees. Id.
187. 21 C.F.R. § 314.110(a) (2009).
188. See 21 C.F.R.§314.105.
189. 21 C.F.R § 314.7(b). Supplemental applications are differentiated based on minor
changes to be described in an annual report, moderate changes which require a thirty-day
premarket notification to the FDA, and major changes which must be approved prior to distri-
bution of the drug. 21 C.F.R § 314.7(a)-(c).
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DNA or RNA pathway.1 90 Biologics comprise a large and diverse group of
products used in a myriad of diseases and conditions. Traditional drugs are
small molecule products produced by chemical synthesis combining chemi-
cals and reagents in inert reaction vessels.' 9' These drugs are well-defined
and thoroughly characterized; whereby biologics are typically less thorough-
ly characterized as they are derived from living materials, susceptible to en-
vironmental conditions and are of greater complexity. 92 Since biologics are
protein based, they are typically administered via injection to bypass enzy-
matic destruction in the stomach, whereas drugs are typically administered
orally.19 3 Biologics generally have less stability than traditional drugs and
often require refrigeration. 4
Biologics are biochemically complex, exhibiting a primary structure
(amino acid sequence), a secondary structure (disulfide bonding), tertiary
structure (elaborate bending), and a quaternary structure (final aggregation of
the compound).'95 Additionally, many of these products are glycosolated
having multiple shapes called isoforms. 196 Thus, biologics exist in multiple
conformations and may readily convert between each. 197 It is possible, in
fact, that all possible variants of a biologic are not fully characterized.
98
Manufacturing biologics is a highly sophisticated process, much differ-
ent from traditional drugs.'99 Biologics often utilize a specific cell line and
require precise and consistent manufacturing involving highly developed
190. See Michael Kleinberg & Kristen Wilkinson Mosdell, Current and Future Consid-
erations for the New Classes of Biologicals, 61 AM. J. HEALTH-SYs. PHARMACY 695, 697
(2004). In very basic terms a certain biologic (protein) is sought. See id. Scientists obtain the
gene to code for the protein. See id. at 698. This gene is then inserted into a living system-
typically bacteria, yeast or Chinese hamster ovary-which then produces the desired product,
which then is highly purified. See id. at 699. Interestingly, the first recorded use of biological
therapeutics involves the use of an antibiotic obtained from moldy soy in China, in 500 BCE,
to treat boils. Philip E. Johnson, Implications of Biosimilars for the Future, 65 AM. J.
HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY S 16, S 16 (2008).
191. These drugs refer to typical organic-based drugs such as aspirin, Lipitor and Norvasc.
See D.J.A. Crommelin et al., Shifting Paradigms: Biopharmaceuticals Versus Low Molecular
Weight Drugs, 266 INTL. J. PHARMACEUTICS 3,4 (2003).
192. See Kleinberg & Mosdell, supra note 190, at 696.
193. See A. Baumann, Early Development of Therapeutic Biologics-Pharmacokinetics, 7
CURRENT DRUG METABOLISM 15, 18 (2006).
194. Johnson, supra note 190, at S20.
195. See Crommelin et al., supra note 191, at4.
196. See id. at 6.
197. See Janet Woodcock et al., The FDA's Assessment of Follow-on Protein Products: A
Historical Perspective, 6 NATURE REVS. DRUG DisCov. 437, 438 (2007).
198. See id.
199. Johnson, supra note 190, at S16. Amazingly, bioengineering dates back to 4000
BCE, where yeast fermentation was used to produce alcohol for festivity. Id.
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fermentation processes and purification methods.20° Even very slight devia-
tions in the manufacturing process can result in an altered bioactivity chang-
ing the actions of the compound.'O Impurities and contaminants pose se-
rious threats and some may contain intrinsic infectious agents.2°
The cloning technology required to manufacture biologics originated in
the 1970s and is a highly complex and sequential process. 3 The first bi-
ologic approved was recombinant insulin (Humulin, Lilly), in 1982.204 Since
then more than 250 biologics have been approved and marketed in the Unit-
ed States. 20 ' These products range from botulinum neurotoxin for wrin-
kles,20 6 to monoclonal antibody based therapies for colon cancer,20 7 to vac-
cines for chicken pox, 208 to enzyme replacement therapy for Pompe dis-
ease.
209
As biologics are rather complex molecules, they carry risks not typical-
ly associated with traditional drugs.210 The most important of these risks is
immunogenicity. 211 Immunogenicity refers to neutralizing antibody forma-
tion against a foreign substance, in this case, a biologic.2 12 Biologics are
inherently immunogenic because of their biochemical composition.213 To
200. Felcone, supra note 10, at 26.
201. See Jeremiah J. Kelly & Michael David, No Longer "If" but "When": The Coming
Abbreviated Approval Pathway for Follow-on Biologics, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 115, 120
(2009).
202. See Woodcock et al., supra note 197, at 438.
203. Robert I. Roth & Nicholas M. Fleischer, A Follow-on Biological Drug Is Not a Bio-
generic: Lessons from Omnitrope and Valtropin, 6 J. GENERIC MEDs. 237, 238 (2009). See
generally Johnson, supra note 190 (for a concise review). In 1958, Frederick Sanger won the
noble prize for his work in protein sequencing when he sequenced insulin. Frederick Sanger-
Autobiography, NobelPrize.org, http://nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/chemistrylaureates/1958/
sanger-bio.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
204. Thijs J. Giezen et al., Safety-Related Regulatory Actions for Biologicals Approved in
the United States and the European Union, 300 JAMA 1887, 1887 (2008).
205. Id.
206. See Botox Cosmetic Home Page, http://www.botoxcosmetic.com/hom.aspx (last
visited Apr. 17, 2010).
207. Erbitux, http://www.erbitux.comlindex.aspx (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
208. Merck Vaccines: Varivax, http://www.merckvaccines.comlvaccines/vari/varivax.
html (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
209. The Successful Effort to Develop Myozyme for Pompe Disease at Genzyme FAQs,
The Successful Effort to Develop Myozme and Bring New Hope for to Families Affected by
Pompe Disease, http://www.genzyme.compompemovie/pompe-movie-faq.htm (last visited
Apr. 14, 2010). This drug is based on the research of a father with "two children with Pompe
disease." Id. The story is depicted in the movie, Extraordinary Measures. Id.
210. Giezen et al., supra note 204, at 1888.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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confound the issue, biologics are almost universally injectable and thus pose
increased immunogenic potential.214 Immunogenicity tends to render a drug
ineffective and may cause allergic type reactions that could be fatal.1 5 Bi-
ologics may also pose an increased risk of infection and cancer compared to
traditional drugs.216 Traditional drugs may also be immunogenic, although
the concern is that biologics pose a greater risk.217
It is important to differentiate biologics from gene therapy and other
fields of biotechnology. Although these areas may ultimately merge, the
current state of technology is separate and regulation involving gene therapy
is at its infancy and beyond the scope of this paper.28
1. Biologic Regulation under Public Health Service Act
Biologics are a subset of drugs regulated primarily under Section 351 of
the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) and part 600 of title 21 of the Code of
Federal Regulations.2 '9 The PHSA was established in 1944 and served to
revise and consolidate the existing public health legislation including the
Biologics Control Act of 1902.20 Under the PHSA, biologics are defined as
"any virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, or analogous product applica-
ble to the prevention, treatment or cure of diseases or injuries of man. 22'
Biologics further intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treat-
ment, or prevention of disease are regulated as drugs and therefore subject to
the requirements of the FDCA and the PHSA.222
214. Scott Gottlieb, Biosimilars: Policy, Clinical, and Regulatory Considerations, 65 AM.
J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY S2, S5 (2008).
215. Giezen et al., supra note 204 , at 1888.
216. Id.
217. See id.
218. See Johnson, supra note 190, at S19-20.
219. Public Health Service Act § 351,42 USC § 262 (2006); 21 C.F.R pt. 600 (2009).
220. David M. Dudzinski & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Scientific and Legal Viability of Fol-
low-on Protein Drugs, 358 NEw ENG. J. MED., 843, 844 (2008). In 1901, thirteen deaths of
children by tetanus were traced back to a diphtheria antitoxin obtained from the blood of local
horse named Jim. Linda Bren, The Road to the Biotech Revolution: Highlights of 100 Years
of Biologics Regulation, FDA CONSUMER, Jan.-Feb. 2006, at 50, 51. At the same time, a
similar tragedy occurred in New Jersey. Id. These events prompted Congress to regulate
biologics with the passage of the 1902 Biologics Control Act, also known as the Virus-Toxin
Law. Id.
221. 21 CFR § 600.3(h) (2009).
222. Gottlieb, supra note 214, at S3-S4.
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Interestingly, biologics are regulated within both CBER and CDER.22 3
Under the current regulatory framework, some "therapeutic biologic prod-
ucts" are reviewed and regulated by CBER, while others are reviewed by
CDER.2 4 Effective June 30, 2003, CDER regulates monoclonal antibodies
and proteins for therapeutic use, which comprise a rather significant propor-
tion of biologics. 225 CBER regulates cellular products, gene therapy, vac-
cines, allergenic extracts, blood and blood products, and certain fibrinolyt-
ics.226 Drugs licensed under the PHSA are exempt from the licensing re-
quirements of the FDCA. 27
a. Biologic Licensing Application
Biologics are developed similarly to traditional drugs and are subject to
the same rigors of pre-market clearance.228 Their research and development
follows a very similar pathway including preclinical evaluation and clinical
testing involving Phase I, Phase H, and Phase Ell studies. 229 Biologics almost
universally have some Phase IV requirements based on the anticipated risks
in large-scale populations.
230
Unlike traditional drugs, biologics are reviewed and approved under a
Biologic License Application (BLA).23' An approved BLA is analogous to
an NDA and provides the legal authority to move a biologic in interstate
commerce. 232 Generally speaking, a BLA is approved on the basis of safety,
purity, and potency of a biologic. 233 Additionally, the application must con-
223. Due to "historical vagaries," a number of recombinant biologics were approved under
an NDA and regulated by CDER. See Dudzinski & Kesselheim, supra note 220, at 844.
224. FDA, Transfer of Therapeutic Products to the Center for Drug Evaluation and Re-
search, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CBER/ucmi33463.htm (last visited
Apr. 17, 2010); Drug and Biological Product Consolidation, 68 Fed. Reg. 38067, 38068 (June
26, 2003).
225. See FDA, Transfer of Therapeutic Products to the Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research, supra note 224. These include such drugs as cytokines-e.g. interferons-and
enzymes-e.g. thrombolytics. See id.
226. Id. These include such drugs as immunoglobulins and antivenims. Id.
227. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(j) (2006).
228. See Jessica R. Underwood, What the EU Has That the US Wants: An Analysis of
Potential Regulatory Systems for Follow-On Biologics in the United States, 10 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 419, 435 (2007).
229. See id. at 435-36.
230. See id. at 436.
231. 21 C.F.R. § 601.20 (2009).
232. See 21 C.F.R. § 601.20(b)(1), (d).
233. 21 C.F.R. § 601.20(c). New Drug Application (NDA) is predicated on safety, effica-
cy, and compliance with current good manufacturing practices. U. S. Food & Drug Admin.,
New Drug Application (NDA), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/
25
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tain data on chemistry, manufacturing, and controls; non-clinical pharmacol-
ogy and toxicology; patent information; and labeling.234 The requirements
for approval of a biologic are often more challenging than traditional drugs
since any small deviation in manufacturing can result in a significant impact
on the bioeffectiveness, and the risk of unanticipated problems is a greater
threat.235
V. GENERIC DRUG REGULATION / DRUG PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT
TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1984
During the 1970s and 1980s, drug prices began to increase rather dra-
matically.236 To complicate the issue, the wide availability and acceptance of
generic drugs was not to be found.237 Most states do not substitute laws for
the pharmacist, and generic manufacturers had to undergo costly and time-
consuming full-scale studies to gain approval. 38 Moreover, generic compa-
nies had to wait for a patent to expire before ever commencing research and
production, thus effectively extending the innovators patent.239 Suffice it to
say, the generic drug industry was not bountiful and brand companies en-
joyed lengthy patent protections.
Seeking to streamline this concern, increase the availability and use of
generic drugs, all while protecting innovation and patents, Congress passed
the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984.2
40
This landmark legislation, commonly referred to as the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments to the FDCA 1 sought to strike a balance between two impor-
tant competing interests: increased availability of generic drugs and en-
HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/NewDrugApplicationNDA/
default.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2010). Potency of biologics is essentially synonymous with
the term efficacy as it relates to drugs. See 21 C.F.R. § 601.20(c).
234. See 21 C.F.R. § 601.20.
235. See Underwood, supra note 228, at 436.
236. See David Pryor, Commentary, A Prescription for High Drug Prices, 9 HEALTH AFF.
101, 101-02 (1990).
237. See id. at 102-03.
238. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN
FTC STUDY 4 (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf [he-
reinafter FTC 2002 STUDY].
239. Satish Chintapalli, Excessive Reverse Payments in the Context of Hatch-Waxman, 10
N.C. J. L. & TECH. 381, 388 (2009).
240. See generally Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)).
241. Named after Republican Senator Orrin Hatch (Utah) and Democrat Congressman
Henry Waxman (California). See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act
and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 187 (1999).
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hanced patent protection for branded products.242 The Act consists of two
titles. Title I amended the FDCA and established an abbreviated approval
pathway for generic drugs under an Abbreviated New Drug Application
(ANDA). 24 3 It also provides exclusivity for brand drug approvals. 244 Title II
authorizes the extension of patent terms for approved new drug products.245
Brand drugs receive "an extension term equal to one-half of the time of the
investigational new drug (IND) period ... plus the NDA period .. . [with a]
maximum extension [of] five years and the total market exclusivity time
cannot exceed fourteen years.''246 Hatch-Waxman requires all drug applica-
tions under the FDCA to file patent information with the FDA.247 This way,
the agency has clear direction in granting exclusivity for brand drugs and
approving generic drugs. Hatch-Waxman only applies to drugs and the
FDCA, and did not include provisions to allow for an abbreviated approval
pathway under section 351 of the PHSA.24 8
In order to fully appreciate Hatch-Waxman, one must grasp the drug
approval process for generics. There are currently three mechanisms by
which a generic drug can enter the prescription market when a patent expires
on a brand product-NDA, ANDA, and Paper NDA. All three are available
under the FDCA.249 The use of an NDA for a generic drug is not commonly
used, based on the cost and complexity of the information included. The
ANDA is a much more efficient and cost effective route and is the most
commonly employed pathway. Another abbreviated approval mechanism is
the Paper NDA, more technically referred to as 505(b)(2) approval. The
Paper NDA is similar to an NDA but allows the FDA to rely on published
data and previously determined assessments of safety and efficacy in its ap-
proval. Although a paper NDA can apply to a generic drug, it is typically
reserved for minor changes of an existing drug, such as formulation or dos-
250ing.
242. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 § 101.
243. Id. Before the approval of this act, generic drugs were required to undergo the same
rigorous clinical trials as branded drugs. FTC 2002 STUDY, supra note 238, at 3. These were
typically large scale randomized controlled efficacy and safety trials. Id. Needless to say, this
research was cumbersome, costly, and complex. It was also unnecessary.
244. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 § 101.
245. Id. § 201.
246. Mossinghoff, supra note 241, at 190 (1999).
247. See id. at 189.
248. Dudzinski & Kesselheim, supra note 220, at 845.
249. 21 U.S.C. § 355(6)0) (2006).
250. Gregory J. Glover, The Influence of Market Exclusivity on Drug Availability and
Medical Innovations, 9 AM. Ass'N PHARMACEUTICAL SCL J. E312, E313 (2007).
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A. Generic Drugs
The generic drug industry is a true boon by all social accounts.25' Ge-
neric drugs represent almost seventy percent252 of all prescriptions filled, yet
account for only sixteen percent of the expenditure.253 The average brand
drug costs $120 per month and the average generic drug costs less than
$35.254 Over the past ten years, the United States healthcare has saved ap-
proximately $700 billion dollars through the use of generic drugs. 255 Generic
utilization occurs as follows. Physicians can prescribe a brand drug or a ge-
neric. 256 If the prescriber writes out a prescription for a brand drug, the
pharmacist typically substitutes a generic, if available. 57 In fact, under Med-
icare law, pharmacists are typically required to substitute.258 Alternatively,
many insurance companies may only pay for a generic if available.259 If a
patient insists on a brand product or there is no generic available, the patient
receives and pays for the brand drug.
2 60
Despite the considerable impact associated with generic drugs, the eco-
nomic framework remains somewhat musing and the full cost savings is of-
ten delayed and slow to materialize.2 6' The first generic to market is typical-
ly priced at about ninety-four percent of the brand drug's price, thus offering
a very nominal cost-savings.262 It is not until a second generic comes to mar-
251. See FTC 2002 STUDY, supra note 238, at 9.
252. This is "up from 19 percent in 1984 when Hatch-Waxman was" approved. Id. at i.
253. Facts at a Glance, Generic Pharmaceutical Association, http://www.gphaonline.org/
about-gpha/about-generics/facts (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
254. Id.
255. Press Release, Congressman Frank Pallone, Jr., Pallone Statement at Health Hearing
on Follow-On Biologic Drugs 2 (June 11, 2009), available at http://energycommerce.house.
gov/PressI 11/20090611 /pallone.open.pdf.
256. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECT. GEN., GENERIC DRUG
UTILIZATION IN THE MEDICARE PART D PROGRAM 5 (2007).
257. See id. "Generic drug substitution is only possible when a health care provider pre-
scribes a multisource drug (i.e., a brand name multisource drug or its associated equivalent)."
Id.
258. See id. at 4.
259. See id. at 3.
260. See DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECT. GEN., supra note 256, at
3.
261. See FDA, Generic Competition and Drug Prices, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/
CentersOffices/CDER/ucm l29385.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
262. Id. Although this seems outrageous, it is actually quite logical. When a first generic
comes to market, insurers almost always require the generic drug over the brand drug, thus
significant market share is almost guaranteed. Nevertheless, once a second generic comes to
market, the less expensive product receives the great lion's share of market push, thus poten-
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ket that a substantial, fifty percent cost savings is seen, and it takes approx-
imately seventeen generics competing until a ninety percent cost-savings is
realized.2 63
B. Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA)
Hatch-Waxman codified an abbreviated approval pathway for generic
drugs via 505(j) of the FDCA. 264 The general requirements of an ANDA are
chemistry, manufacturing, labeling, and proof of bioequivalence.265 Collec-
tively this is termed Therapeutic Equivalence. 266 The ANDA is considered
abbreviated because it does not require proof of preclinical or clinical data,
both of which are required in an NDA.267 Since generic drugs do not require
this information, the cost to bring a generic to market is greatly reduced.
Instead of relying on clinical data, the sponsor for a generic drug has to prove
bioequivalence to the brand drug.268 Bioequivalence is established when "the
rate and extent of absorption of the test drug do not show a significant differ-
ence from the rate and extent of absorption of the reference drug. ' 269 This is
essentially a surrogate marker used to demonstrate safety and efficacy of the
drug. In place of preclinical data, the sponsor submits only a section on
chemistry allowing the FDA to rely on the reference listed drug approval as
underpinning.27°
An ANDA also has to include information on patents. The generic
sponsor must "certify" the status of the patent they are copying. 27' There are
four types of certification available.272 Paragraph I certifies the challenged
drug has not been patented. 3 Paragraph I certifies the patent has already
expired on said drug.274 Paragraph Ell certifies the date the patent will expire
tially squeezing out the original generic if it does not lower its price. This window of oppor-
tunity is often short lived and not assured, so generic companies use it to maximize profit.
263. Id.
264. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 505(j), 21 U.S.C § 3550) (2006).
265. Id.
266. See id.
267. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)-(j).
268. 21 U.S.C. § 3550).
269. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS, supra note 14, at v.
The "[m]ethods used to define bioequivalence can be found in 21 C.F.R [§] 320.24 [2010] and
include (I) pharmacokinetic (PK) studies, (2) pharmacodynamic (PD) studies, (3) comparative
clinical trials, and (4) in-vitro studies." Id.
270. 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(9).
271. 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(2)(A)(vii).
272. Id.
273. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(l).
274. 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(2)(A)(vii)(II).
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on said drug and assures that the generic drug will not go on the market until
that date passes.275 Paragraph IV certifies that the patent is not infringed or is
invalid.276
Paragraph IV certifications are the most controversial and contentious.
The first generic to successfully file Paragraph I certification receives a 180-
day marketing exclusivity. 277 This very clever provision is intended to pro-
mote immediate filing of an ANDA by creating a monopoly within a mono-
poly for the first generic approved. This incentive appears to be very intelli-
gently calculated and provides sufficient reward to increase generics without
too much hindrance on the overall market. Paragraph IV certifications re-
ceive a lot of press and have spawned a number of tactical business practices
and legal maneuverings.278
The filing of a Paragraph IV certification also triggers a peculiar thirty-
month stay provision preventing the generic drug to market. 279 A generic
company that files an ANDA must notify the FDA and the brand company
who then has forty-five days to file an infringement action, if so desired.28°
If no suit is filed and the application is complete and approvable, the FDA
can license the drug for immediate market.2 81 If the brand company does file
an infringement action, the FDA stays "approval of the ANDA until the ear-
liest of: 1) the date the patent[] expire[s]; 2) a final determination of non-
infringement or patent invalidity by a court in the patent litigation; or 3) the
expiration of 30 months from the receipt of notice of the [Plaragraph IV cer-
tification. '282 Practically speaking, by simply filing an infringement action,
the brand company receives a thirty-month stay of approval of the generic;
the theoretical approximate of the time to litigate the matter. Amazingly,
two and a half years of additional exclusivity comes with low risk and no-
minal costs-a noticeable incentive. This automatic stay frustrates the sys-
tem and further increases the gaming strategy employed in drug develop-
ment.
275. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(ll).
276. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
277. FTC 2002 STUDY, supra note 238, at 7; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)().
278. See, e.g., ParagraphFour.com, Paragraph Four Explained, The Generic Approval
Process, http://www.paragraphfour.com/explained/process.html (last visited April 17, 2010).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. See id.
282. FTC 2002 STUDY, supra note 238, at 39.
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C. Paper NDA and the Case of Omnitrope®
In addition to 505(j) approval with an ANDA, Hatch-Waxman also au-
thorizes 505(b)(2) pathway for abbreviated approval, the so-called paper
NDA.283 This application allows for a sponsor to rely upon previously pub-
lished literature for certain aspects of the application, including the FDA's
determination of safety and efficacy. 2 4 Data on the reference listed drug is
then used for the remaining requirements such as pharmacology and toxicol-
ogy.285 Drugs approved under a paper NDA are not necessarily substitutable
for the comparator product and not AB listed in the Orange Book.286 The
paper NDA is considered a potential source of approval for a generic biolog-
ic, although the impediments seem overwhelming and the framework is not
intended to regulate such actions and has never been used.287 Technically
speaking, there is no paper BLA and the authority for approval of a generic
biologic under the current regulatory system is uncertain.288
Interestingly, the paper NDA has been used to approve one biologic,
despite vigorous opposition and extensive legal wrangling.289 On May 30,
2006, the FDA approved Omnitrope®290 for marketing, despite a citizen's
petition from Pfizer, Biotechnology Industry Organization, and Genentech
urging otherwise. 91 Omnitrope® was approved, in part, through reliance of
the FDA's determination of safety and efficacy of the reference listed drug,
283. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2), (0); Glover, supra note 250, at E313.
284. Michael P. Peskoe, Paper NDAs and the Drug Price Competition Act: A Last Hur-
rah,? 40 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 323, 323 (1985); see also Letter from Steven K. Galson, Dir.,
Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, to Kathleen M. Sanzo et al., Counsel for Petitioners 5
(May 30, 2006), available at http:lwww.fda.govlohrmsldockets/docketsl04p0231/0 4 p-02 3 1-
pdnOOOl.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Steven K. Galson] (describing the practice of a paper
NDA for drug approval).
285. See FTC 2002 STUDY, supra note 238, at 5.
286. LIONEL D. EDWARDS ET AL., PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF PHARMACEUTICAL
MEDICINE 383 (2007).
287. See Gottlieb, supra note 214, at S4.
288. See Donald E. Segal et al., Regulatory Pathway for "Biosimilar" Products Debated,
LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Wash. D.C.), Feb. 2007, at 1, 2.
289. See id.
290. Growth Hormone Deficiency Treatment: Omnitrope, Sandoz, http://www.omnitrope.
com/omnitrope/index.html (last visited April 17, 2010). Omnitrope is a recombinant human
growth hormone manufactured by Sandoz. Id. The innovator product is Genotropin, mar-
keted by Pfizer, Inc. Genotropin Official Site-Human Growth Hormone, http://www.geno
tropin.com/content/lndex.aspx (last visited April 17, 2010).
291. Letter from Steven K. Galson, supra note 284, at 1; FDA, Drug Details, Omnitrope,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/index.cfm?fuseaction=Search.DrugDet
ails (last visited April 17, 2010).
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Genotropin manufactured by Genetech, approved under an NDA. 92 FDA
review found the drug was "sufficiently similar . . .to warrant [such] re-
liance" despite strong protest.293 The application also included clinical data
obtained by Genentech. 294 The FDA found a relative lack of complexity of
the hormone and the availability of sufficient analytical techniques to ap-
prove the drug.295 The FDA was clear this route of approval would not apply
to biologics licensed under the PHSA or to products lacking a well-
documented history of use.296
D. Exploitation of Hatch- Waxman
Practically speaking, Hatch-Waxman accomplished its aim. By most, if
not all accounts, Hatch-Waxman increased access to generic drugs while
providing sufficient protection and incentives for brand companies to contin-
ue to be innovative. However, like most if not all legislation, Hatch-
Waxman is riddled with loopholes that have undermined some of its intent
and has been subject to exploitation and abuse by brand companies seeking
to maintain patent protection and prevent competition.297 The legality of
many of these strategies is made on a case-by-case basis and a number of
settlements and decrees have occurred.298
The loopholes center around two provisions of the Paragraph IV certifi-
cation: 180-day exclusivity and thirty-month stay. 299 Brand company mani-
pulation of the 180-day exclusivity center around payments to generic com-
panies not to market and the manufacturer of so called, "authorized gener-
ics.''3°° Brand companies have been accused of filing baseless infringement
actions to trigger the thirty-month stay provision and even file inequitable
patent applications to delay market entry.3" 1 Lastly, brand companies can
delist a patent after successful Paragraph IV certification to cause recertifica-
292. See Segal et al., supra note 288, at 2. Genotropin was approved under a NDA and
not a BLA although biochemically it is a biologic drug. FDA, Drug Details, Genotropin,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/index.cfm?fuseaction=Search.Label-A
pprovalHistory#apphist (last visited April 17, 2010).
293. Letter from Steven K. Galson, supra note 284, at 8.
294. See Gottlieb, supra note 214, at S4.
295. See Dudzinski & Kesselheim, supra note 220, at 845.
296. Id.
297. FTC 2002 STUDY, supra note 238, at 39-40.
298. See id. at 16-17.
299. Avery, supra note 16, at 179.
300. Id. at l81.
301. Id. at 179-80.
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tion under Paragraph I and the subsequent loss of exclusivity by the gener-
iC.302ic.
3°
The FTC has investigated a number of agreements not to compete be-
tween a brand company about to lose patent protection and the generic com-
pany awarded 180-day exclusivity. 3 3 These "pay for delay" agreements
often involve a "reverse payment," whereas the brand company simply pays
the generic company to not compete during the exclusivity period.304 Interes-
tingly, courts have been inconsistent as to the legality of this practice and
some "pay for delay settlements" have been deemed legal.305 The Sixth Cir-
cuit has ruled that reverse payments are a per se violation.30 6 Meanwhile, the
Eleventh Circuit approaches the issue using an analysis somewhere between
per se and rule of reason.307 Using a three part analysis the court looks to
"(1) the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent; (2) the extent to
which the agreements exceed that scope; and (3) the resulting anticompeti-
tive effects. 30 8
Authorized generics refer to drug products manufactured by a brand
company, identical to the brand product, but sold-i.e. authorized-as a ge-
neric.309 The brand company can either sell the drug directly or license it to
another company to label and sell. 310 Brand companies often introduce au-
thorized generics during the 180-day exclusivity period as a first generic. 1
Although this clearly undermines the intent of Hatch-Waxman, is anticompe-
titive, and diminishes the incentive for generic companies to compete, it ap-
pears fully legal.31 2 To date, the courts have upheld the legality of authorized
generics through two appellate cases.313 In fact, the United States Court of
Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, affirmed the decision to not even hear
a citizen's petition made by a generic company, Teva.31 4 Additionally, the
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, found no legal sufficiency to
302. Id. at 198.
303. See FTC 2008 REPORT, supra note 25.
304. Avery, supra note 16, at 181.
305. FTC 2009 REPORT, supra note 184, at i.
306. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003).
307. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1311 & n.27 (11 th Cir.
2003).
308. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11 th Cir. 2005).
309. John M. Rebman, Dr. Strange Drug, or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love
Authorized Generics, 12 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 159, 159 (2009).
310. Id.
311. Id. at 160.
312. See id. at 160, 181.
313. See Teva Pharm. Indus. Ltd. v. Crawford, 410 F.3d 51, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Mylan
Pharms. Inc., v. FDA, 454 F.3d 270, 276-77 (4th Cir. 2006).
314. Teva Pharn. Indus. Ltd., 410 F.3d at 51, 55.
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disallow the entry of an authorized generic by the NDA holder as they were
within their statutory right.315
The thirty-month stay provision of Hatch-Waxman has been a real lure
for brand companies, who have in turn sought inventive ways to trigger the
stay.3 16 A number of these techniques have been tried in court. For example,
in the case of In re Neurontin Antitrust Litigation,3 17 Pfizer, the brand manu-
facturer of Neurontin, was accused of filing sham litigation against the ge-
neric company, submitting false and fraudulent patents for inclusion in the
Orange Book, and misconduct of patent prosecutions to impair competi-
tion.318 In Aventis Pharmaceuticals v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,3 19
the court found incontrovertible evidence of inequitable conduct by the brand
company with intent to deceive the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office in
failing to disclose information in a patent application.32°
The FTC stands in strong opposition to tactics aimed at undermining the
integrity of Hatch-Waxman.32t In fact, in 2008 the Commission issued a
report detailing these practices, describing their anti-competitive effects.322
The report was instrumental to changes in the original act that helped close
some of the loopholes at the time. Additional legislation has been proposed
to further close loopholes, but the system still remains open to manipulation
and exploitation.323
The transcendent value of Hatch-Waxman is grounded on its impact on
competition and, ultimately, drug prices. Although not perfect, the Act
spawned an entire generic drug industry, while maintaining and rewarding
innovation, which is no easy task.
315. Mylan Pharms., 454 F.3d at 276-77.
316. See, e.g., FTC 2009 REPORT, supra note 184, at 57, 7 1.
317. No. 02-1390, 2009 WL 2751029 (D.N.J. Aug. 28, 2009).
318. Id. at *1, *4; see FTC 2002 STUDY, supra note 238, at 40.
319. 525 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
320. Id. at 1349.
321. See FTC 2008 REPORT, supra note 25; see also John R. McNair, Note, If Hatch Wins,
Make Waxman Pay: One-Way Fee Shifting as a Substitute Incentive to Resolve Abuse of the
Hatch-Waxman Act, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 119, 126.
322. FTC 2008 REPORT, supra note 25, at 1.
323. For example, the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act (S. 369) prohibits
generic companies from entering into agreements with brand companies to delay or cease
from offering a generic option to the market. See PRESCRIPTION ACCESS LITIGATION FACT
SHEET: THE PRESERVE ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE GENERICS ACT (S. 369)/ THE PROTECTING
CONSUMER ACCESS TO GENERIC DRUGS ACT OF 2009 (H.R. 1706), July 22, 2009, http:llwww.
prescriptionaccess.org/docs/Fact Sheet HR 1706 S369.pdf [hereinafter FACT SHEET: H.R.
1706/S. 369].
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VI. CURRENT STATE OF GENERIC BIOLOGICS
Hatch-Waxman established a mechanism for generic drugs in the Unit-
ed States.324 However, this act did not predict the role of biologics and a void
was created. Meanwhile biologics, constitute a rising market share, and as
patents continue to issue and expire, the need to substitute products in at-
tempted cost-savings is a major policy concern. In the aughts, there were a
number of failed attempts to regulate generic biologics; however, each meas-
ure was systematically defeated in Congress. 325
In June 2009, the Federal Trade Commission released a comprehensive
analysis on generic biologics. 326 The report found that competition between
a biologic and its generic counterpart is more likely going "to resemble
brand-to-brand competition, rather than [the traditional] brand-to-generic
competition," because of the cost and complexity of bringing a generic bi-
ologic to market.327 The report claimed that even in the presence of a generic
biologic, the brand product would retain seventy to ninety percent of its mar-
ket share, which is quite different than the current system, where erosion is
immediate and glaring.328  The report further asserted generic biologics
would provide a cost-savings of approximately ten to thirty percent.329 Over-
all, the report is clear that existing incentives provided for in Hatch-Waxman
are sufficient for biologics, signifying that anything longer than five years of
exclusivity will be anticompetitive.33°
A. Generic Biologics Defined
The BPCIA defines a generic biologic as "a biological product ap-
proved under an abbreviated application for a license of a biological product
that relies in part on data or information in an application for another biolog-
324. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)).
325. See, e.g., Access to Life Saving Medicine Act, H.R. 1038, 110th Cong. (2007); Pa-
tient Protection and Innovative Biologic Medicines Act of 2007, H.R. 1956, 110th Cong.
(2007); Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2007, S. 1695, 110th Cong.
(2007); Pathway for Biosimilars Act, H.R. 5629, 110th Cong. (2008).
326. See FTC 2009 REPORT, supra note 184.
327. Id. at iii.
328. Id. at v.
329. Id. at v. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that generic biologics will be
priced at a twenty to twenty-five percent reduction initially and increase to forty percent by
the fourth year. CONG. BuDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE: S. 1695, BIOLOGICS PRICE
COMPETITION AND INNOVATION ACT OF 2007 7 (June 25, 2008), available at http://www.cbo.
gov/ftpdocs/94xx/doc9496/s 1695.pdf [hereinafter CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE].
330. FTC 2009 REPORT, supra note 184, at 57.
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ical product licensed under section 351 of the Public Health Service Act. ,331
Biosimilarity is defined as a product "highly similar to the reference product
notwithstanding minor differences in clinically inactive components; and
there are no clinically meaningful differences between the biological product
and the reference product in terms of the safety, purity, and potency.332
Technically speaking, generic drugs refer to products manufactured
without trademark protection.33 Scientifically speaking, the term has come
to mean a drug that has the same dosage, safety, strength, route of adminis-
tration, quality, performance, and intended use as a brand drug-essentially
an exact copy. 334 A generic drug is considered an identical copy to a brand
drug with an associated cost-savings.335
Many claim the term "generic biologic" is a fallacy and inappropriate to
use.336 It is claimed that independently manufactured biologics should not be
considered identical to each other based on a number of manufacturing va-
riances and resulting subtleties.337 Biologics are manufactured in living sys-
tems and fluctuations inevitably occur.338 Instead, these copies are only con-
sidered similar and follow-on to a brand drug. 339 Accordingly, the choice
term represents a meaningful characterization of the issue and driver of some
of the legal, social, and scientific discussions.
Developing a generic biologic involves identifying the target drug, es-
tablishing duplicative or similar methods of production and product characte-
rization to validate similarity. Generic biologics are referred to by a myriad
of terms including: biosimilars, biogenerics, follow-on biologics, follow-on
proteins, and subsequent entry biologics (SUB). There is no officially ac-
cepted scientific nomenclature, although the term biosimilars appears to have
become vernacular in the United States with the passage of the BPCIA. Bio-
similar is the preferred term in Europe, whereas Canada utilizes SUB to refer
to these products. An all encompassing and adequate term may not exist.
331. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3139(a)(2), 124
Stat. 119 (2010).
332. Id. § 7002(b).
333. See FDA, FACTS ABOUT GENERIC DRUGS (2009), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
Drugs/EmergencyPreparedness/BioterrorismandDrugPreparedness/UCM 134015.pdf.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. See, e.g., G. Gast] et al., ASHO Position Paper on Biosimilars, 2 MAG. EUR. MED.
ONCOLOGY, 2009, at 232.
337. EUROPEAN MEDS. AGENCY (EMEA), COMM. FOR MEDICINAL PRODS. FOR HUMAN USE,
GUIDELINE ON SIMILAR BIOLOGICAL MEDICINAL PRODUCTS 4 (Oct. 30, 2005), available at
http://www.ema.europa.eu/pdfslhumanlbiosimilar/043704en.pdf [herinafter EMEA 2005].
338. Gottlieb, supra note 214, at S4.
339. See id. at S2.
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Nevertheless, for the sake of discussion, generic biologic may be appro-
priately defined as a biological drug product with the same biochemical
structure and function as a trademarked product with equivalent purity, po-
tency, and safety.
1. Challenges with Generic Biologics
The primary goal of generic biologics involves product safety.340 As
with all drugs, safety is paramount and the production of an equivalent prod-
uct with an equivalent safety profile is essential. The practical goal, mean-
while, is to establish a system that supports substitution of the generic bi-
ologic at the pharmacy level with an associated cost-savings to the payor.34 '
Based on the complex biochemical nature of biologics, the creation of
an equivalent generic poses a myriad of challenges before it can be widely
produced and accepted. First, there must be a system to define and establish
structural equivalency. Replication must be feasible based on the patent and
there must be a method to characterize the product as equivalent. Next, there
must be a method to assure functional equivalency of products, namely safe-
ty, purity, and potency. Practitioners and patients must then have confidence
in the substitution of these products and payors must realize an actual cost-
savings.
The requirements for establishing equivalency are going to vary by the
drug involved.342 While certain classes of biologics may only require general
guidelines to establish equivalency, other, more complex agents may require
very specialized and particular approaches to demonstrate both structural and
functional equivalency. 43 The establishment and inclusion of Compendium
standards should be sought.3' Any variances determined will then have to
be supported by evidence of no effectual difference for equivalency to be
established. 34'
Structurally, generic biologics are thought to be extremely difficult to
produce an exact replica, unlike small molecule generics which are rather
easy to replicate and produce.346 Differences in cell lines, manufacturing
practices, temperature, pH, finishing and storage conditions, and protein ag-
340. Gottlieb, supra note 214, at S3.
341. See id.
342. See Crommelin et al., supra note 191, at 14.
343. See id.
344. See Emily Shacter, Follow-on Biologics Workshop: Scientific Issues in Assessing
the Similarity of Follow-on Protein Products (2005), http://www.biosimilarstoday.com
Shacter.pdf.
345. See Crommelin et al., supra note 191, at 14.
346. See Woodcock et al., supra note 197, at 438.
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gregation, can all affect product structure. 47  Another challenge involves
analyzing these products for structural equivalency. 348 Traditional drugs are
considered easy to characterize, whereas characterization of biologics is ex-
tremely difficult.349 Crystal studies only capture the current confirmation of
a biologic, which can exist in multiple states.35° Highly advanced analytical
techniques such as X-ray crystallographic diffraction, MRI, and reversed-
phase high-performance liquid chromatography are going to be required to
establish structural equivalence, if at all possible under the current state of
technology. 351 Orthogonal methods will be needed and multiple techniques
may be required.352
Batch to batch variability inevitably occurs with biologics and impuri-
ties may be present 353 Brand companies have argued information on varia-
bility is a trade secret and confidential commercial information is available
only to the FDA.354 They argue that any use of protected information would
require the FDA to pay just compensation under the Fifth Amendment's Tak-
ings Clause.355
Establishing functional equivalency will also pose some challenges.
Even though we have reliable biomarkers to assess equivalence with most
drugs, the physical complexity of biologics and the various confirmations of
isoforms are problematic. 356 For instance, a biologic could have the same
response in a pharmacodynamic measure such as blood pressure with its
comparator, but have other, unanticipated responses, i.e. side effects, based
on its folding characteristics and the way it binds to a certain receptor.357
As immungenecity is a concern with all drugs, it becomes a greater
concern with generic biologics, especially when interchangeability is consi-
347. See Crommelin et al., supra note 191, at 14.
348. See id.
349. Gottlieb, supra note 214, at S4.
350. See Crommelin et al., supra note 191, at 6.
351. See The Quality and Purity of Retacrit(R) Was Readily Demonstrated and Was
Shown to Maintain Haemoglobin Levels in Patients with Chronic Kidney Disease, MEDICAL
NEWS TODAY, May 27, 2009, http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articies/151513.php.
352. See Shacter, supra note 344.
353. See Crommelin et al., supra note 191, at 14.
354. Letter from Kathy J. Schroeher, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Johnson & Johnson, to Divi-
sion of Dockets Management, Food & Drug Admin., Dep't of Health & Human Servs., (July
1, 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/04p017l/04p-0171 -c000002
-01-voll.pdf.
355. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV. Specifically, information on chemistry, manufac-
turing, and controls are believed to be widely protected. See Letter from Kathy J. Schroeher,
supra note 354, at 6 & n.9.
356. See Crommelin et al., supra note 191, at 14.
357. Gottlieb, supra note 214, at S4.
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dered.358 Since biologics are complex proteins, they can elicit a number of
immune responses, depending on a number of factors. 359 Although very sim-
ilar, two inexact biologics can elicit very different immune responses.
Overall, biologics represent a very diverse complexity of products, and
thus many of these considerations do not apply equally and the FDA will
have to deal with many of these issues on a case-by-case basis, at least in-
itially.36 The FDA has not yet developed a formal system to evaluate equi-
valence and is going to have to have an open approach, likely involving a
consensus of the professional and scientific communities.36z Only when
structural and functional equivalencies are truly established with confidence,
can we begin talking about product substitution and cost-savings.
The FDA will have to compile some system that supports substitution
for biologics, like the Orange Book's AB rating system for conventional
drugs.363 Once equivalency is established, it is likely that physicians and
pharmacists will be amenable to product substitution as the current system of
generics has demonstrated. Legislators can then move to require substitu-
tion. Opposition is expected with lobbying efforts by the Biotechnology
Industry Organization (BIO), and PhRMA, the biologic and drug trade asso-
ciations respectively, leading the way. Payors, concerned with the bottom
line, will likely push for substitution, helping advance the system and pro-
mote acceptance.
The cost of developing a generic biologic is large, estimated at $100-
$200 million; much greater than a traditional generic drug.364 There will be a
need for particular cell lines and highly specialized manufacturing processes,
the availability of which may prove a tough find. A full biogeneric industry
does not currently exist as the need has not arisen. 365 The review process is
going to be extremely challenging and may ultimately require a significant
amount of data, and may thus be costly to the generic company. 36 Neverthe-
less, once the regulatory framework is established, companies will step for-
ward as it remains a highly lucrative industry and drug prices should be ex-
pected to fall over time.
358. See J.L. Prugnaud, Similarity of Biotechnology-Derived Medicinal Products: Specif-
ic Problems and New Regulatory Framework, 65 BR. J. CLIN. PHARMACOL. 619,620 (2007).
359. See Crommelin et al., supra note 191, at 11.
360. See id.
361. See id. at S4, $7.
362. Richard G. Wenzel, Introduction, 65 AM. J. HEALTH SYST. PHARM. S 1, S i (2008).
363. See id.
364. Posting of Maggie Mahar, The Battle over Biologics Begins, to http://www.health
beatblog.com/2009/06/the-battle-over-biologics-begins-.html (June 26, 2009).
365. See Engelberg et al., supra note 5, at 1917-18.
366. Id. at 1918.
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B. International Regulatory Approach
Australia does not categorize biologics separate from drugs, so their po-
sition is less problematic. 367 Canada issued a Draft Guidance for Sponsors:
Information and Submission Requirements for Subsequent Entry Biologics
(SEBs) and Related Documents on January 30, 2008.368 The draft document
was revised and republished on March 27, 2009, and is amidst review and
further development.
369
Canada does not plan on establishing a new regulatory framework, but
will instead rely upon its existing statutory authority for Health Canada to
review and approve these products. 370 SEBs will be analyzed on a case-by-
case basis and reviewed as new drugs. 37' They will not follow the abbre-
viated approval pathway available for generic drugs nor be substitutable.372
They will have no exclusivity, per se.373 Nevertheless, the appeal is that the
submission can rely, "in part, on prior information regarding the authorized
innovative biologic drug in order to present a reduced clinical and non-
clinical package. 374 Additionally SEBs can be submitted for innovator bi-
ologics not approved in Canada.37
Overall, the Canadian approach appears to be a reasonable approach to
the issue. As technology further advances, costs continue to rise and patents
fall, Health Canada may need to reassess the issue and consider substitutabil-
367. See Prescription Drugs-Generic vs Brand Name, Crossborderpharmacy.com,
http://crossborderpharmacy.com/canadian-generics-vs-brand-name.html (last visited Apr. 17,
2010).
368. Health Can., Draft Guidance for Sponsors: Information and Submission Require-
ments for Subsequent Entry Biologics (SEBs) (March 27, 2009), available at http://www.hc-
sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/alt -formats/hpfb-dgpsa/pdf/consultation/2009-03-seb-pbu-notice-avis-
eng.pdf [hereinafter Health Can., Draft Guidance for Sponsors].
369. See id. at a-b.
370. See id. at 2.
371. Id. at4-6.
372. Id. at 4.
373. See Health Can., Draft Guidance for Sponsors, supra note 368, at 4.
374. Id. at I.
[A] suitable reference biologic drug exists that: a) was originally authorized for sale based on
a complete data package; and b) has significant safety and efficacy data accumulated such that
the demonstration of similarity will bring into relevance a substantial body of reliable data; the
product can be well characterized by a set of modern analytical methods; and the biologic
drug, through extensive characterization and analysis, can be judged similar to the reference
biologic drug by meeting an appropriate set of pre-determined criteria. Products employing
clearly different approaches to manufacture than the reference biologic drug (for example, use
of transgenic organisms versus cell culture) will not be eligible for authorization as SEBs.
Id.
375. Id. at 3, 6. This is made upon request of the Minister and "must include sufficient
information to explicitly explain the link." Id. at 6.
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ity at the pharmacy level, the possibility of a reduced review time for the
agency and incentives for manufacturers to produce and market these prod-
ucts. The first drug approved under the subsequent entry biologic review
system was Omnitrope® on April 20, 2009.376
The European Regulatory Union maintains the benchmark regulation
for biosimilar review and approval in the world.377 This pathway was estab-
lished in June 2003 through modification of the EU's medical products sta-
tutes. 37 8 The European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products
(EMEA), the European equivalent to the FDA, oversees the implementation
of the review process. The regulations approach generic biologics as distinct
from traditional generic drugs based on complexity, thus requiring a different
approach to an abbreviated approval. 379 Review and approval occurs on a
case-by-case basis using product specific guidance documents issued through
an open and public process. 380 The system calls for "[ain appropriate compa-
rability exercise ... to demonstrate . . . similar profiles in terms of quality,
safety, and efficacy. ' '381 Although the system can approve a biosimilar drug,
it leaves the determination of substitution to national authorities.382 France
and Spain recently enacted legislation that prohibits automatic substitution of
a generic biologic, and the system as a whole is still in its infancy.
383
Under EMEA review, a biosimilar application contains non-clinical da-
ta, as well as clinical data.3' The section on non-clinical data is meant to
identify changes in response between the two products and is based on in
vitro studies, toxicokinetic measurements, etc.385 The clinical section is in-
376. Notice of Decision for Omnitrope, Health Canada I (May 15, 2009), available at
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/alt'formats/hpfb-
dgpsa/pdf/prodpharma/nd ad_2009_omnitrope_ I 13380-eng.pdf.
377. See Filiz Hincal, An Introduction to Safety Issues in Biosimilars/Follow-On Bio-
pharmaceuticals, 7 J. MED., CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, & RADIOLOGICAL DEF. 1, 4 (2009).
Interestingly, in 1986 the European Union initially approved a system to approve generic
biologics. Gottlieb, supra note 214, at S6. This system was quickly seen as incomplete and
problematic and abandoned. Id.
378. See EUROPEAN MEDS. AGENCY (EMEA), COMM. FOR MEDICINAL PRODS. FOR HUMAN
USE, GUIDELINE ON SIMILAR BIOLOGICAL MEDICINAL PRODUCTS CONTAINING
BIOTECHNOLOGY-DERIVED PROTEINS AS ACTIVE SUBSTANCE: NON-CLINICAL AND CLINICAL
ISSUES 3-4 (Feb. 22, 2006) available at http://www.ema.europa.eu/pdfs/human/biosimilar
/4283205en.pdf [hereinafter EMEA 2006].
379. See Gottlieb, supra note 214, at S3, S7.
380. Id. at S7.
381. EMEA 2006, supra note 378, at 3.
382. Nuala Moran, Fractured European Market Undermines Biosimilar Launches, 26
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 5, 5 (2008).
383. Id.
384. See EMEA 2006, supra note 378, at 4-6.
385. Id. at 4.
41
Seamon: Antitrust and the Biopharmaceutical Industry: Lessons from Hatch-
Published by NSUWorks, 2010
NOVA LAW REVIEW
tended to demonstrate clinical comparability, including efficacy and safe-
ty.386 The EMEA guidelines also require a full chemistry evaluation.
387
Guidance documents suggest that comparability efficacy studies may be
needed, although they are not required. 388 The extent of abbreviation varies
and some approvals will be akin to the brand drug's approval with rigorous
data requirements. 389 Additionally, class-specific guidelines can be estab-
lished for product reviews. 390 The EMEA system provides for an exclusivity
period of ten years for an innovator reference product.39 1 Moreover, the ap-
plicant can obtain another year of exclusivity, for a total period of eleven
years, if the biologic gains a new indication in the first eight years of its ex-
clusivity which provides a "significant clinical benefit in comparison [to]
existing therapies. ' '39' The regulations also require post-approval surveil-
lance to monitor such things such as immunogenicity.
393
The first drug approved under the biosimilar review process in Europe
was Omnitrope® in January 2006.394 In 2007, the world's bestselling biolog-
ic, erythropoietin, saw the approval of two biosimilar drugs in Europe, al-
though market penetration has been slow to transpire.395 The true impact of
biosimilars in practice has not yet come to fruition and in many ways the
system is still in its early infancy. Advances in technology, experience, and
legislation will refine the system over time.
C. Proposed U.S. Legislation
In the United States, the FDA approves drug products for marketing un-
der authority of the FDCA and the Public Health Services Act.3 96 It has been
"argued that the FDA has the authority to approve generic" biologics under
386. Id. at 5-6.
387. See id. at 5.
388. See, e.g., id. at 5-6.
389. See Frank, supra note 98, at 843.
390. See EMEA 2006, supra note 378, at 4.
391. EUROPEAN COMM'N, ENTER. & INDUS. DIRECTORATE-GEN., GUIDANCE ON ELEMENTS
REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THE SIGNIFICANT CLINICAL BENEFIT IN COMPARISON WITH EXISTING
THERAPIES OF A NEW THERAPEUTIC INDICATION IN ORDER TO BENEFIT FROM AN EXTENDED (1 1-
YEAR) MARKETING PROTECTION PERIOD 1 (2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
enterprise/pharmaceuticals/eudralex/vol-2/c/guideline_1 4-11-2007.pdf.
392. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
393. See EMEA 2006, supra note 378, at 6-7.
394. Press Release, EUROPA, Biotech Medicines: First Biosimilar Drug on EU Market
(Apr. 20, 2006), http://europa.eu/rapidlpressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/51 1.
395. Moran, supra note 382, at 5.
396. See Underwood, supra note 228, at 432-33.
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an abbreviated follow-on pathway using the current regulatory framework.397
Nevertheless, the FDA has taken no action on the issue and has left the issue
to Congress to legislate.3 98
Over the last few years, there have been a number of proposed, and de-
feated, bills dealing specifically with generic biologics in the United
States.39  It was not until the push for a national healthcare reform bill
gained momentum did the prospect of legislation authorizing generic biolog-
ics become increasingly apparent and the chance of success elucidate. De-
spite strong opposition and quarrel, Congress maintained a steadfast move
toward approval of a healthcare bill under the unwavering persistence of
President Obama. One measure passed in the Senate4" and one in the House,
thus setting the stage for bicameral national health reform.4°' These two bills
each included a provision authorizing generic biologics.
On November 7, 2009, H.R. 3962, the Affordable Health Care for
America Act, passed in the House of Representatives by a 220 to 215 vote.40
2
Division C, Title V, Subtitle C, Part 2 dealt exclusively with Biosimilars. 403
The bill amended the PHSA and establisheed a framework to approve a ge-
neric biologic.4°4 A drug was considered "biosimilar" by evidence of analyt-
ical studies, animal studies, and clinical data that show no clinically mea-
ningful differences in safety, purity, or potency from the reference (brand)
product. 4 5 It also included a provision, whereby the HHS Secretary can
waive the requirement for clinical data; although this matter will need to be
further considered either by legislation or regulation. 4° It includes a section
397. Id. at 442.
398. See id. at 425-26.
399. See, e.g., Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act, H.R. 1038, 110th Cong. (2007); Pa-
tient Protection and Innovative Biologic Medicines Act of 2007, H.R. 1956, 1 10th Cong.
(2007); Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2007, S. 1695, 110th Cong.
(2007); Pathway for Biosimilars Act, H.R. 5629, 110th Cong. (2008).
400. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2009)
(enacted). This was originally a House bill, but was co-opted by the Senate, as all revenue
bills have to start in the House. Id.
401. See generally Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong.
(2009).
402. CNN.com, House Passes Health Care Reform Bill (Nov. 8, 2009), http://www.cnn.
com/2009/POLITICS/i I/07/health.care/index.html.
403. H.R. 3962, § 2575. Only one republican voted for this bill. See Robert Pear, Senate
Passes Health Care Overhaul on Party-Line Vote, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 25, 2009, at IA.
404. H.R. 3962 § 2575.
405. H.R. 3962 §§ 2575(a)(2), (b)(3).
406. H.R. 3962 § 2575(a)(2).
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on guidance documents, and empowers the FDA (HHS Secretary) to issue
product class-specific guidance in approving biosimilar drugs.4 °7
The bill provided for an exclusivity period of twelve years for innovator
products.4"8 There are no further exclusivity provisions for changes in indi-
cations, dosage form, or route of administration, unlike Hatch-Waxman.4' 9
The bill includes a rather complex process for patent disputes and includes a
provision whereby agreements between the brand and generic company relat-
ing to manufacture, marketing, or sale of biosimilar products must be re-
viewed by the Assistant Attorney General and Federal Trade Commission.4 °
It provides a mechanism, whereby a generic biologic can be established as
substitutable. 41 ' The first biologic considered "interchangeable" receives a
one year exclusivity to incentive filing, like Hatch-Waxman, authorized for
traditional drugs.412 Additionally, the bill provides for an additional six-
month exclusivity period for testing in a pediatric population and charges
user fees to the manufacturer, like those authorized under PDUFA.4 13
The Senate bill dealing with generic biologics was H.R. 3590, the Pa-
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act.414 On December 24, 2009 this bill
passed in the Senate by a vote of sixty in favor, thirty-nine opposed, and one
present/not voting.4 5  Title VII, Subtitle A was entitled "Biologics Price
Competition and Innovation Act of 2009" and was a close reflection of the
House bill.416 It provided a similar framework to approve a generic biologic
drug product through the PHSA.417 Under this act, a biologic is deemed bio-
similar to a reference biologic if analytical studies, animal studies, and clini-
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. See Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111 th Cong. § 2575 (2009).
410. See Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111 th Cong. § 2575(a)(2).
411. Id. (for biologics that are administered more than once the application must demon-
strate safety of switching back and forth).
412. Id. (interchangeability is established if the two products are biosimilar, expected to
provide the same clinical results, and there is no increased risk by alternating between the two
products).
413. Id.
414. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, l11th Cong. (2009)
(enacted).
415. Pear, supra note 403 (Not a single Republican voted in favor of this bill.). "Senator
Jim Bunning, Republican of Kentucky, did not vote." Id.
416. See H.R. 3590, § 7001 (2009).
417. This provision was authored by Senators Kay Hagan (D-N.C.), Mike Enzi (R-Wyo.),
Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and Barbara Mikulski (D-Md.). Press Release, Biotechnology Indus.
Org., Provisions in the Senate Health Care Bill Help Patients, Promote Innovation, Encourage
Job Growth (Dec. 24, 2009), available at http://bio.org/news/pressreleases/newsitem.asp?id
=2009_1224_01.
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cal data show no clinically meaningful differences in safety, purity, or poten-
cy from the reference (brand) product.418 Also like the House bill, it pro-
vided for an exclusivity period of twelve years for the innovator product,
granted a one-year marketing exclusivity for the first product deemed inter-
changeable, and included a six month pediatric exclusivity provision.419 Im-
portantly, the bill did not consider pay-to-delay agreements like the House
bill. 420 Lastly, the bill required a determination on the savings to the federal
government be calculated.42'
D. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and Biologics Price
Competition and Innovation Act
On March 21, 2010, the House of Representatives voted in support of
the Senate-approved H.R. 3590 by a vote of 219-212,422 setting the state for
President Obama to sign into law landmark legislation involving healthcare
and for the first time authorizing generic biologics in the United States. On
March 23, 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act became
Public Law 11 1-148.423
The Act establishes a user-fee supported pathway for approving generic
biologics through the PHSA.424 The Act includes a section providing for
product class-specific guidance documents to facilitate approval, as are uti-
lized in Europe.425 It also provides a six month pediatric exclusivity provi-
sion which is a valuable social incentive.426 There is no Orange Book re-
liance for sharing of patent information, and instead the law details an infor-
mation sharing process between the brand and the generic company on intel-
427lectual property.
The generic company does not have to certify any of the brand holder
patents and there is no automatic thirty-month-stay provision, under the law
which effectively closes the problematic loophole of Hatch Waxman. In-
stead, the law delineates a multi-step process for patent infringement con-
418. H.R. 3590, § 7002(a)(2).
419. H.R. 3590 § 7002(a)(6)(A),(a)(7)(A), (m)(2)(a).
420. H.R. 3590 § 7002(a)(5)(B).
421. H.R. 3590 § 7003(a).
422. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 7001-03,
124 Stat. 119 (2010). This bill was decided on strong partisan lines with 219 Democrats vot-
ing in favor and 34 voting against. All 178 Republicans voted in opposition.
423. See id.
424. See id. §§ 7001-03.
425. Id. § 7002.
426. Id.
427. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 7002.
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cerns and requires the generic company to notify the brand company 180
days prior to marketing.4 8 This preserves the brand company's ability to
seek a preliminary injunction.
The exclusivity period is twelve years from the date of brand drug ap-
proval.429 The debate on this issue was one of the most polarizing. BIO had
sought fourteen years.430 Generic trade associations sought eight years.43'
The White House and President Obama were somewhere in between, seeking
exclusivity of ten years.432 Clearly a significant exclusivity period is a requi-
site requirement. This issue has been a vital component to the widespread
success of the generic industry. Generic drugs often become available the
same day the FDA exclusivity period ends on the brand drug and the wide
spawn of generics has been notable. As the future of medicine is going to be
biologically based, pioneering companies must be confident in the ability to
recoup research, development costs, and make a significant profit on their
discoveries. However, based on the FTC report and the success of Hatch-
Waxman, twelve years seems overly generous and may in fact stifle competi-
tion.433
The Law provides a one-year exclusivity for the first interchangeable
product, which is greater than 180 days authorized under Hatch-Waxman.434
This provision should help incentivize development and provide reward for
generic manufacturers. Nevertheless, the Law failed to bar the use of autho-
rized generics by brand companies to undermine generic development. The
law also failed to prohibit pay-to-delay agreements. This has been a conten-
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS. Ass'N, A FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGics REGIME WITHOUT STRONG
DATA EXCLUSIVITY WILL STIFLE THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW MEDICINES 5 (Sept. 26, 2007),
available at http://www.bio.org/healthcare/followonbkg/FOBSMarket-exclusivity-20070926.
pdf 5 (last visited Apr. 2, 2010). BIO cites empirical evidence that the breakeven point for a
biologic takes thirteen to sixteen years. Id. at 4.
431. See Gottlieb, supra note 214, at $7. Congressman Waxman, the House Energy and
Commerce Chairman, has reportedly sought exclusivity of five to seven years. Jessica Dye,
Obama Wants to Limit Biologic Protection in Health Bill, LAw360, Jan. 15, 2010,
http://www.law360.com/articles/143763.
432. Id.
433. See Press Release, GPhA Asks President Obama to Urge Congress to Strike Bioge-
nerics from Health Care Reform If Provisions Are Not Substantially Altered,
http://www.gphaonline.org/media/press-releases/2009/gpha-asks-president-obama-urge-
congress-strike-biogenerics-health-care-ref (last visited Mar. 30, 2010). Generic Pharmaceut-
ical Association strongly opposed this exclusivity period, calling the period "little more than
camouflaged protection of the unacceptable and unsustainable status quo." Id.
434. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 7001-03, 124
Stat. 119 (2010).
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tious issue for the industry and the courts, and Congress missed a ripe oppor-
tunity to voice its concern.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In Francisco's Money Speech, as Ayn Rand wrote in Atlas Shrugged,
"[w]ealth is the product of man's capacity to think.' 435 We are at the dawn
of landmark legislation geared to modernize the generic pharmaceutical in-
dustry and spawn the next era of lower cost medications. A properly struc-
tured abbreviated pathway will enhance existing research and discovery,
award generic companies the opportunity to compete and decrease the finan-
cial burden on the U.S. healthcare system. Clearly, there is a need for gener-
ic biologic legislation in the United States and the time has finally arrived.
The marketplace for biologics continues to expand, the price for prescription
drugs continues to surge, patents for existing products have begun to expire,
and analytical technology has reached a sufficient juncture. All the key
players are at the table and our elected officials accomplished the task. Now
the pressure is on the FDA to deal with the next set of challenges the law will
provide.
Undoubtedly, the FDA faces an enormous challenge with the passage of
an abbreviated pathway for biologics. As always, the FDA must assure that
patient safety trumps all. The FDA can then establish some equivalency
system to support product substitution, like the current system whereby some
products are substitutable, and others are not.436 Then, stakeholders such as
managed care organizations and pharmacy benefit managers can establish
protocols and clinical guidelines to drive practice and decrease costs.
4 37
Once generic biologics become available, the market influence and pe-
netration will be unique compared to the current system of traditional gener-
ics. Early competition will likely resemble brand-to-brand competition and
prices may not be as low as some may anticipate.43 8 The four dollar co-pay
435. AYN RAND, ATLAS SHRUGGED 381 (Signet 1996) (1957).
436. Individual states, regulating the practice of pharmacy, may establish a negative drug
formulary whereby pharmacists will have a list of drugs that, by law, they cannot substitute,
although the FDA finds them interchangeable. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 64B16-27.500
(2010) (Florida's example of a negative drug formulary). This is a public policy issue where a
Board of Pharmacy has made a determination in opposition to the FDA. See id.
437. See id.
438. FTC 2009 REPORT, supra note 184, at iii; see also Emerging Health Care Issues:
Follow-on Biologic Drug Competition: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Health Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, I 11 th Cong. 9 (2009)
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may be some time off.4 39 Additionally, in vast contrast to traditional gener-
ics, some early generic biologic companies may have to utilize unprecedent-
ed marketing campaigns to try and drive market share.44 Ultimately the
market acceptance to generic biologics will be similar to traditional drugs
over time and patients will see a significant increase in cost savings. Moreo-
ver, because the U.S. Government is the largest payor of prescription drugs
in this country, government acceptance of these products will have a pro-
found effect on market acceptance.4'
The likely players to emerge from the generic biologic marketplace are
biotechnology companies, big pharmaceutical companies, 442 and large gener-
ic houses. 43 Currently, it is traditional generic companies being the most
aggressive in developing biologics, especially those with a strong European
influence.4' Generic companies in India will also emerge as early players,
especially as that country is slow to respect U.S. patent law. 445 Some claim
that the approval of a generic biological approval pathway will deter venture
capitalism. 4 6 This is short sighted. The generic industry in this country has
blossomed since Hatch-Waxman and competition only works to make a sys-
tem more efficient and robust.
439. See Milt Freudenheim, Side Effects at the Pharmacy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2006, at
Cl (describing Wal-Mart's four dollar generic program and how it prompted its competition
like Target to also institute such a program).
440. See Moran, supra note 382, at 5.
441. Prescription Drugs: Overview of Approaches to Control Prescription Drug Spend-
ing in Federal Programs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Federal Workforce, Postal Ser-
vice, and the District of Columbia of the H. Comm. On Oversight and Government Reform,
111 th Cong. 2 (2009) (Statement of John E. Dicken, Dir., Health Care, Gov't Accountability
Office). The Federal Employees Health Benefits Program is the largest employer-sponsored
health insurance program in the country covering about eight million federal employees, reti-
rees, and their dependents. Id. This includes Medicare, VA, DOD, and Medicaid. Id. at 1-3.
442. Merck, one of the largest pharmaceutical companies in the world, recently purchased
an entire platform of generic biologic-related assets from Insmed Inc., a smaller biotechnology
company, for $130 million. lnsmed Completes Sale of Follow-On Biologics Platform to
Merck & Co., Inc. for Gross Proceeds of $130 Million., PR NEWSWIRE, (Mar. 31, 2009),
http://investor.insmed.com/releasedetaii.cfm?ReleaselD=-3745 12.
443. Behnke et al., supra note 9, at 2.
444. Id.
445. Geeta Anand, Drug Makers Decry Indian Patent Law, WALL ST. J. (ONLINE), Feb.
I1, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB]0001424052748703455804575057621354459804.
html.
446. DON WARE & NICK LITrLEFIELD, FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS AND PATENT REFORM: WILL
THEY DISCOURAGE VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN THE BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY? 5
(2009), available at http:llwww.foleyhoag.com/NewsCenter/PublicationsleBooksl-lmedia/
F4A4DDAI41 IB44CDB7DC87436809E310.ashx.
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The passage of the BPCIA is essential to the future of healthcare and
cost containment in the United States. Expectedly, any legislation of this
complexity will open unanticipated loopholes. No system is perfect and the
law may need further revision and amendments over time. Nevertheless, the
future of medicine is upon us and the need for generic biologics is overdue.
Science continues to blaze its path, while the corresponding policy inevitably
lags. Meanwhile, we are only at the tip of the iceberg. Biobetters' 7 and
tailored gene therapy448 are evolving and will pose additional generic consid-
erations that will have to be dealt with. Remember, "[t]his shit's chess, [it
ain't] checkers." 449
447. Biobetters refer to new versions of existing brand drugs with enhanced characteristics
such as improved delivery, safety, or efficacy. Behnke et al., supra note 9, at 2. Frequently, a
basic manipulation of a single amino acid sequence or other biochemical change in an existing
drug can provide an improved profile. See id.
448. See generally W. Kalow, Pharmacogenetics and Pharmacogenomics: Origin, Status,
and the Hope for Personalized Medicine, 6 PHARMACOGENOMICS J. 162 (2006).
449. TRAINING DAY, supra note 1.
49
Seamon: Antitrust and the Biopharmaceutical Industry: Lessons from Hatch-
Published by NSUWorks, 2010
